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A dozen countries had weak institutions in 1960 and yet sustained high rates of growth subsequently.
We use data on their characteristics early in the growth process to create benchmarks with which to
evaluate potential constraints on sustained growth for sub-Saharan Africa. This analysis suggests that
what are usually regarded as first-order problems -- broad institutions, macroeconomic stability, trade
openness, education, and inequality -- may not nowbe binding constraints in Africa, although the extent
of ill-health, internal conflict, and societal fractionalization do stand out as problems in contemporary
Africa. A key question is to what extent Africa can rely on manufactured exports as a mode of "escape
from underdevelopment," a strategy successfully deployed by almost all the benchmark countries.
The benchmarking comparison specifically raises two key concerns as far as a development strategy
based on expanding exports of manufactures is concerned: micro-level institutions that affect the costs
of exporting, and the level of the real exchange rate -- especially the need to avoid overvaluation.
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Conventional wisdom has long been negative on African growth. Sub-Saharan Africa 
is commonly regarded as destined to remain poor either because of its geography (including 
its unique disease burden) or its ethnolinguistic fractionalization (leading to repeated 
conflicts) or its deep-rooted corruption. The precise mechanisms vary, but a standard 
argument has been that Africa’s economic prospects are not bright because its long-standing 
problems are hard to fix. 
In contrast, some more optimistic recent views hold that Africa either is improving by 
itself and/or could improve dramatically if more foreign aid were provided.
2 Again, the 
precise mechanism varies, but these views are unified by much more positive assessments of 
Africa’s growth potential (although they disagree on how much additional funding through 
aid is desirable.) 
There is no doubt that Africa has done badly, on average and for the most part, not 
just over the past 20-40 years, but in fact since the beginning of modern economic growth in 
the nineteenth century. It is also indisputable that much of Africa is currently doing quite 
well—for the region south of the Sahara, growth in total GDP will likely have exceeded 5 
percent in 2006 for the third straight year and per capita growth is running in the range of 
3.5-4 percent in recent years.
3 The controversy rather lies with how to think about the last 
                                                 
2 The Commission on Africa (often referred to as the Blair Commission) articulated the first view; see 
also Collier and O’Connell (2006). The U.N. Millennium Project, headed by Jeffrey Sachs, has taken 
the second position. 
3 The IMF growth forecasts for 2007 are 6.3 percent for GDP and 4.4 percent for GDP per capita, 
though it should be acknowledged that there is a well-established optimistic bias in these forecasts: 
see Timmermann (2006). These estimates are based on treating sub-Saharan Africa as one country, 
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decade or so, as well as the current situation and immediate future. In particular, are there 
indications that parts of Africa can sustain growth at rates that are consistent with lifting 
entire countries out of poverty—as East Asia did in the decades after 1960? 
The key word here is “sustain.” Is today’s growth likely to be sustained for 10 or 15 
or more years? We know that what is associated with growth accelerations is not necessarily 
what keeps growth going—for example, an increase in commodity prices sparked growth in 
much of Africa during the 1960s, but this growth proved hard to sustain as political conflicts 
developed. 
There is not yet a unified theory of sustained growth. As a consequence, there is also 
not an accepted equation into which we can plug values to obtain the likely duration of a 
rapid growth spell. However, there are at least three plausible views regarding what is 
associated with crises and derails growth, i.e., what tends to cause decelerations. 
First, while weak economic and political institutions do not appear to prevent growth 
episodes, they are very much associated with severe crises and the derailment of growth 
(Acemoglu et. al., 2003, Satyanath and Subramanian, 2007). It is hard to escape bad 
institutions. Good leaders can make a difference for a while, but when they leave office, 
countries with weak institutions (i.e., autocracies) will often suffer a relapse (Jones and 
Olken, 2005a). 
Weak institutions are associated with and arguably manifest in high degrees of 
inequality (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005a). Inequality can curtail expansions 
both because societies with unequal distributions handle the distributional consequences of 
adverse external shocks poorly (Rodrik, 1999). Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2006), looking 
                                                                                                                                                       
i.e., they are averages across countries weighted by GDP. Table 1a and Appendix Table 9 provide 
(continued…)   3
at a broad panel of post-1945 accelerations, find that the duration of such episodes is 
negatively related to initial income inequality. Moreover, the effects seem to be very large, 
with each percentage point of the Gini coefficient raising the annual risk that a growth spell 
will end by between 7 percent and 15 percent, relative to the baseline.  
Second, a greater propensity to experience conflict or civil strife might also prove to 
be a key factor curtailing growth accelerations. This might be part of weak institutions or, in 
some cases, it may be that formal institutions are strong while society remains deeply 
divided—and these divisions are sometimes manifest in damaging conflict. 
Third, bad macroeconomic policies (particularly inflation), protectionism and/or 
overvalued exchange rates may choke off growth in the tradable goods sector.
4 This may 
make it harder to find profitable opportunities in the economy as a whole, or it may draw 
resources into imports in a way that proves unsustainable. Across a variety of methodologies, 
for example, overvaluation is robustly correlated with crises, even when controlling for 
deeper determinants of problems, such as inequality and institutions: see, for example, 
Acemoglu et. al., 2003, “Growth and Institutions” in IMF (2003) and “Building Institutions” 
in IMF (2005).  
In addition, there are at least two other possible explanations for poor longer-term 
growth performance that are particularly relevant for Africa: inadequate education and poor 
                                                                                                                                                       
alternative calculations for aggregate growth. 
4 In principle, growth could be sustained without growth in the tradable goods sector. In practice, this 
does not seem to happen in developing countries as they converge toward standards of living in the 
rich countries. Either tradable goods are particularly important in productivity growth directly, 
through some form of spillover, or this sector has important indirect effects (through its demands for 
better institutions.)   4
health.
5 Both are symptoms of insufficient physical capital (i.e., not enough schools and 
clinics) and initial levels of human capital that are “too low” to allow accumulation of further 
human capital (i.e., not enough teachers and doctors to develop skills in healthy young 
people). Both of these factors could conceivably limit the returns on productive private 
investments—for example, some minimum amount of skill or a basic road network may be 
necessary to support a modern manufacturing sector. Perhaps there are temporary booms, 
based on commodity prices, and then collapses when prices fall because skills have not 
developed further. 
What is the threshold level at which any of these indicators signal a potential problem 
with sustained growth? This is hard to know in the abstract and presumably depends on the 
context, including the interaction between various indicators. One plausible benchmark, 
however, is the recent (post-1945) experience of countries that started with weak institutions 
(and relatively low income levels) but nevertheless were able to sustain rapid growth. (There 
is, of course, not one definition of “rapid” growth; we look at various alternatives below.) 
Relatively few (we count no more than 12–see below) initially poor countries have 
managed to sustain rapid growth (and improve their institutions) to an extent described below 
in the past 50 years. Almost all of these countries experienced a rapid growth in exports; in 
most cases the rapid increase in exports was of manufactures.
6 In this paper, we examine 
whether any African countries show new signs of breaking away from the poverty path 
(through exports of any kind, or in some other way). 
                                                 
5 Taken literally, these views would tend to suggest there should never be growth, rather than a 
problem with sustaining growth. 
6 To be clear, we are not claiming any causal effect from exports to growth. We are merely pointing 
out the association and suggesting that this warrants serious attention.   5
The data that would allow such a comparison (from the right time period—early in 
sustained accelerations) are not readily available; one contribution here is a dataset that 
others can use (and criticize and, hopefully, improve).
7 We therefore present our data in 
considerable detail, documenting the years covered by available sources and discussing the 
weaknesses. 
The good news from this comparison is that, in terms of the standard concerns, the 
prospects for sustained African growth are not unfavorable. Broadly defined, institutions 
have improved. In some cases they have improved dramatically—this reflects the end of civil 
war (which often has destabilizing effects on entire regions) and, in some places, the 
strengthening of democracy. There is also widespread macroeconomic stability and there 
has been a great deal of trade liberalization (in the sense of opening to imports).
8 
However, the benchmarking suggests three important caveats to this positive 
assessment. First, in terms of specific economic institutions, as measured for example by the 
World Bank’s Doing Business project, there remains a wide gap between Africa and most 
other developing countries. In particular, the regulatory costs of exporting are high in much 
of Africa. These numbers have to be used with care because (a) we do not (and will likely 
never) know what these indicators were when East Asia took off, and (b) there are no data 
                                                 
7 We use standard international sources. There is a great that could be done, however, by digging into 
national statistical records. Hopefully, what we present here will serve as a preliminary guide to such 
investigations. 
8 Recent debt reductions have helped: see “Review of Low-Income Country Debt Sustainability 
Framework and Implications of the MDRI [Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative],” (IMF and World 
Bank, 2005b).   6
over time, so perhaps these measures have also improved in Africa. Still, this is a key issue 
for the future.
9 
Second, some African countries seem to have experienced significant real exchange 
rate overvaluation; there are also pressures for further appreciation (e.g., due to higher 
commodity prices or aid inflows). In contrast, almost all the East Asian (and other) success 
stories avoided any episode of significant overvaluation during the entire period of sustained 
growth.
10 There is a definite warning here for Africa, especially since there may be a need for 
these countries to diversify out of commodity dependence and to increase manufacturing 
exports as the East Asian countries did so successfully. 
Third, health indicators in Africa are much less robust today than they were in most 
of the benchmark countries were when they started to grow. In part this is due to weaker 
public health systems, but in part it may also be due to the disease environment in Africa—
for example, malaria has long been a particularly intense problem. Improving health is a first 
order issue for its own sake; the impact on growth, however, remains unclear (see Acemoglu 
and Johnson, 2006). 
Section II briefly reviews what we know about the key constraints on sustained 
growth and explains our choice of benchmark countries. Section III compares recent African 
growth with experience in our benchmark countries. Section IV focuses on comparing 
                                                 
9 We do not know why measures of broad and specific institutions paint such a different picture. 
Leading data sources suggest that economic institutions have improved almost everywhere in the 
world since they became a standard measure (roughly in the mid-1990s). There is a strong possibility 
that a version of the Lucas Critique applies—using historical performance (of broad institutions) to 
guide policy actions can be misleading. Alternatively, it might be thought of as the Goodhart Effect—
any number that becomes a target for policy loses its meaning (while the underlying phenomenon 
does not necessarily change.)   7
institutions in Africa today and our benchmark countries early in their growth process, 
including measures of inequality and conflict. Section V provides a similar comparison for 
trade outcomes and policies, while Section VI looks at the available measures of education 
and health. Section VII concludes. 
 
 
II.   CONSTRAINTS ON SUSTAINED GROWTH 
A.   Institutions 
Economic thinking about growth has changed a great deal over the last 15 years. 
Post-war growth theory stressed the need to accumulate factors of production—capital, and 
unskilled and skilled labor—and to increase the productivity with which these factors are 
used. But it left unanswered what has proved to be the more basic and essential question: 
under what conditions do countries accumulate factors and improve productivity? To answer 
this, attention has turned increasingly to broad economic institutions.  
Broad economic institutions are the set of laws, rules, and other practices that govern 
property rights. They also encompass the provision of law and order, and efficient 
bureaucracies. Good economic institutions create effective property rights for most people, 
including both protection against expropriation by the state (or powerful elites), and 
enforceable contracts between private parties. Although this definition is far from requiring 
full equality of opportunity in society, it implies that societies where only a small fraction 
                                                                                                                                                       
10 Experience in Latin America since 1960 suggests that repeated bouts of overvaluation are 
damaging to both exports and, more broadly, to growth; see Berg, Ostry and Zettelmeyer (2006) for 
more analysis and discussion.   8
of the population have well-enforced property rights do not have good economic 
institutions.
11 
Bad economic institutions mean insecure property rights for most people. Insecure 
property rights can arise from expropriation by the state or powerful elites (often manifest in 
the form of corruption) or from severe political instability (e.g., failed states and 
conflict/post-conflict situations). Serious crime and the collapse of the state’s capacity to 
maintain public order can very quickly undermine property rights. Thus, good economic 
institutions are essential to create markets and sustain efficient market transactions.  
In the case of institutions, perceptions are key—if entrepreneurs can be confident that 
their property rights will be protected, they will be comfortable investing with relatively little 
in the way of formal rights. However, perceptions eventually need to be underpinned by 
actual protections, i.e., if property can be stolen or expropriated, there should be recourse or 
appeal of some meaningful kind. Property rights are never perfect, and conflicts often emerge 
between alternative claimants on property. The issue is the extent to which property rights 
are protected, preferably by a fair and transparent process of dispute resolution.  
The centrality of institutions in the growth process rests on the notion that if a country 
builds good institutions, entrepreneurs will invest in capital goods and ordinary people will 
invest in human capital; strong institutions will also reduce the likelihood of 
economic/financial crises curtailing a growth acceleration, and will smooth adjustment to 
adverse shocks that could also curtail an expansion. Empirical results from a range of authors 
over the past decade suggest that the magnitude of the impact of institutions is likely to be 
substantial. For example, in some estimates, an improvement in sub-Saharan Africa’s level of 
                                                 
11 In a number of resource-rich economies, property rights are reasonably protected in the resource 
(continued…)   9
institutional development from its current average to the mean of developing Asia could be 
associated with as much as an 80 percent increase in its per capital income (from $800 to 
over $1400).
12 This long-run effect is likely to reflect the favorable impact of institutions on 
the duration of growth spells and the volatility of economic growth. 
However, institutions do not necessarily have to be improved directly and 
immediately in order for growth to occur. The question is, therefore, if initial institutions are 
weak, what can we say—quantitatively—about the experience of countries as far as being 
able to initiate growth, and sustain that acceleration. And, in circumstances in which a 
durable acceleration takes place, to what degree is there also a virtuous circle with respect to 
improvements in the quality of broad institutions? These are the issues to which we now turn. 
 
B.   A Benchmarking Approach 
There is a great deal of agreement on the qualitative issues that matter for sustained 
growth, but little hard guidance on the numbers, i.e., when is a potential problem a real 
problem? For example, the recent Barcelona Consensus—drafted by a Who’s Who of growth 
economists—argues that while institutions matter, they are not the whole story.
13 A similar 
point is sometimes made about macroeconomic constraints—for example, inflation can be a 
                                                                                                                                                       
sector itself, but similar protection may not exist economy-wide.  
12 See also Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004, for 
the empirical analysis that gives rise to these estimates.  
13 This is also known as the Barcelona Development Agenda, see 
http://www.barcelona2004.org/esp/banco_del_conocimiento/docs/agenda_eng.pdf. The Barcelona 
participants were: Olivier Blanchard, Guillermo Calvo, Daniel Cohen, Stanley Fischer, Jeffrey 
Frankel, Jordi Galí, Ricardo Hausmann, Paul Krugman, Deepak Nayyar, José Antonio Ocampo, Dani 
Rodrik, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Andrés Velasco, Jaime Ventura, and John Williamson. 
On these issues, there seems to have been considerable convergence with World Bank views; see 
http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/lessons1990s/chaps/frontmatter.pdf   10
problem, but no one argues that low inflation is sufficient to ignite growth. What exactly are 
the critical constraints? 
We develop and apply simple benchmarks, based on the experience of countries that 
plausibly (a) had weak institutions in 1960, and (b) sustained high rates of growth after 1960. 
Point (a) is important because we take seriously the concern that developing countries today 
may be different from European and other countries that either had good institutions already 
by 1850 or were well on their way to developing such institutions.
14 
Our benchmarks are therefore drawn from countries that have recently escaped 
poverty (or are well on their way) despite a difficult starting position, as measured by their 
economic and political institutions. The 12 countries that we characterize as having had weak 
institutions at the time of their growth take-off clearly scored poorly on a widely accepted 
measure of political institutions: on the Polity IV measure of constraint on the executive, 
which ranges from 1-7, their average score was 2.2 (compared with 7 for most advanced 
industrial economies).  
An alternative would be look only at countries that escaped poverty despite weak 
initial economic institutions. Unfortunately, the standard measures of economic institutions 
are available only from the mid-1980s and, given that economic institutions likely improved 
over time in many of these rapidly growing countries, these are not appealing. However, 
Adelman and Morris (1971) compiled measures of economic and social institutions circa 
1960 (actually 1958-63). While their coverage is not as extensive as that of the Polity IV 
database used in this paper, they tell a broadly similar story of economic institutions not 
                                                 
14 While we do not necessarily agree with the arguments and interpretation of historical evidence in 
Chang (2005), we do agree that it may be unreasonable to expect poor countries today to see 
improving their institutions as a necessary condition for growth.   11
being strong at the time of the take-off of the SG countries. Their best proxy for the quality 
of economic institutions is probably the “degree of administrative efficiency of public 
administration.” On this measure, the average score for the sustained growth countries (SGs) 
in 1960 is about the average for a group of all developing countries.
15  
The benchmarking approach has several advantages. It is quite transparent—others 
may disagree with the construction of our criteria, but at least these criteria are clear. Also, 
while the composition of the benchmark can be criticized, once that benchmark is established 
our judgment of what is happening in Africa is driven just by the numbers (not by any 
preconceptions we may have about particular African countries.) 
The main disadvantage of this approach is that it does not incorporate any notion of a 
tradeoff. For example, perhaps good performance on one dimension can compensate for 
weaker performance on another dimension. This being said, the benchmarking of Africa 
today against post-war growth success-from-initial-weakness stories does reveal a number 
of common features that appear to drive the latter and a number of common hurdles that 
African countries appear to need to overcome. 
 
C.   Cases of Sustained Growth Accelerations 
Defining sustained growth accelerations cannot be an entirely objective exercise 
because it depends on the criteria for defining sustained growth and accelerations, in 
particular there can be long debate about the level of growth rates worthy of being regarded 
                                                 
15 There are nine SGs for which this measure is available (China, Malaysia, and Singapore, are 
missing), and their average is 51.1. For the sample of 74 developing countries for which Adelman and 
Morris provide data, the average is 47.7 with a standard deviation of 30. Adelman and Morris provide 
a letter code and a separate conversion to a numerical scale; we applied this scale to the above 
calculations.   12
as high, and also the change in growth that deserves to be called an acceleration. Here we 
adopt the (well-known, but still debated) criteria from Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik 
(2004). These yield a set of sustained growth acceleration that accord broadly with anecdotes 
of success stories—no notable successes are left out, and applying the same criteria in an 
even-handed fashion actually includes several cases that usually do not get much attention.  
The exact criteria are as follows.
16 Countries must have experienced: an improvement 
in growth rates of at least 2 percentage points per capita (this captures the idea of 
acceleration);
17 sustained growth of at least 3½ percent per capita for seven years; and higher 
post-acceleration income level than the pre-acceleration peak (this is to ensure that 
accelerations are not simply a rebound from a prior period of very bad performance, for 
example, due to wars or conflict or other shocks). In addition, growth per capita must remain 
above 3 percent after seven years, which captures the sense that good performance is 
sustained. 
These criteria are actually quite moderate—leading to a doubling of income in 20-35 
years. As we will see, there are (a few) countries that have greatly exceeded these growth 
rates on average. Nevertheless, these numbers offer a minimum level of performance that can 
reasonably be regarded as sustained growth. 
Also, while the timing of these accelerations can be debated further, assigning a 
precise date is useful, because it allows us to focus our attention on the conditions that 
                                                 
16 We exclude from our sample industrial and transition countries. This excludes, for example, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, which have sustained high growth over at least part of this period; 
a number of transition countries are also on the verge of qualifying, if their growth holds up. 
17 While our real interest is in cases of sustained and high growth rates, the fact that many 
sub-Saharan African countries have been stagnating means that attaining high growth will almost 
inevitably require an acceleration. Thus, identifying the features associated with such accelerations is 
likely to be useful.   13
prevailed when the growth rate picked up (and shortly thereafter). Subject to data limitations, 
we can discern something about what was or was not a constraint, and this may be relevant 
for Africa today.  
Our focus is on whether African countries can sustain growth despite weak initial 
institutions, so countries that had accelerations based on strong initial (around 1960) 
institutions already are excluded from our benchmark (the data are not perfect, but countries 
such as Botswana, India, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka are excluded from our sustained growth 
benchmark on this basis).
18 (Botswana and Mauritius will appear in our African data, as that 
is based on geography, rather than country characteristics, but they will be treated there as 
potentially distinct experiences and separated out from our calculations of mean values.) 
Applying these criteria gives 12 countries. Of these, 10 are usually regarded as 
manufacturing export-based models. Of the ten, all but two are East Asian: China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand, and Vietnam. China 
and Vietnam obviously started their growth accelerations much later (around 1980, rather 
than around 1960), but they have shown consistently high growth rates since that time and fit 
our criteria. Tunisia and the Dominican Republic are the other manufacturing export-based 
successes.
19  
                                                 
18 Although India did not grow very rapidly from 1960-80 (per capita growth rate of 1.7 percent per 
year), it experienced a dramatic improvement in performance thereafter (close to 4 percent per year 
after 1980). Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) argue that this turnaround, which was sustained for at 
least ten years without significant policy reforms, could be attributable to the fact that India had 
previously significantly underperformed relative to the quality of its institutions. In this view, a small 
change in the policy environment allowed these institutions to come into play and boost its growth 
record.  
19 The Dominican Republic recently experienced a major banking crisis and growth has decelerated. 
GDP growth per capita averaged 0.2 percent between 2000 and 2004, but bounced back to 7.3 percent 
in 2005. Tunisia seems to fall into the East Asian pattern of having weak political institutions 
initially, but achieving manufacturing-based export success through a combination of consistently 
(continued…)   14
With respect to the other two countries, concerns about data quality limit any 
assessment of Egyptian performance.
20 Only Chile appears to be a real exception to the rule 
of manufacturing-based export success. As such, it might be an interesting model for Africa 
and an alternative to the East Asian escape (from poverty) route. But even here, if we take 
seriously the Adelman and Morris ratings, it would appear that Chile had strong economic 
institutions already by 1960. As in the case of Botswana, these favorable initial conditions 
might have played a role in alleviating the effects of the natural resource curse.
21 Moreover, 
in the case of Chile, while copper has been an important export, Chile has also developed 
agribusiness/aquaculture exports that are very high value-added products. 
 
D.   Why Did Manufacturing Exports Matter So Much (after 1960)? 
This benchmarking strategy suggests we should pay attention to exports, and—
perhaps—particularly to manufacturing exports. One possible reason is that manufacturing 
exports help create a middle class that favors further strengthening of institutions. 
Theoretically, the idea is that institutions do not spring up unassisted or without some 
foundation of support from various social groups. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005a) 
review some historical evidence on this point, and argue that it is the interaction of economic 
and political power that produces (or changes) institutions. The literature that finds 
                                                                                                                                                       
competitive exchange rate and government assistance to manufacturing. If we had set the growth 
threshold slightly higher, e.g., at 4 percent, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, and Tunisia would not 
have qualified as sustained growth cases, but the other countries would still have qualified. 
20 Part of this concern stems from the puzzling coexistence of sustained growth over a 25-year period 
and a decline in the share of overall exports relative to GDP of about 8 percentage points. 
21 We need to be careful in assessing the prospects for countries, such as Gabon or Sao Tomé and 
Principe, where oil reserves are large relative to the economy. Some oil exporters have done very well 
since 1960, e.g. Brunei, Saudi Arabia and other small Gulf states; they do not make it into our set of 
benchmark countries due to lack of data.   15
significant effects of institutions on outcomes may have drawn too much attention to a state 
variable (institutions) relative to the forcing variables (the power of various groups).
22 
In particular, expansion of trade may sometimes create profound changes in the 
distribution of economic power, with consequences for political power and, consequently, for 
institutions. This is one interpretation for the effects of the expansion of long-run trade 
through the Atlantic, to Asia and the New World, after 1500 (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson, 2005b).
23 However, trade per se does not necessarily lead to better institutions; if 
the returns from trade fall into the hands of monarchs or a small elite, they may actually lead 
to a concentration of power and, ultimately, worse institutions. 
Although we do not have definitive evidence on this point, we note that while the 
Sustained Growth cases began their growth episodes with weak political institutions, over 
time, they benefited from a virtuous circle in which economic and political institutions 
improved. This highlights the notion that institutions are not immutable, but can respond to 
economic and policy changes, and thus that the quality of broad institutions is not a 
permanent barrier to long-term growth. A significant number of countries with sustained 
growth have improved their institutions over time, thus laying the foundation for sound 
growth in the medium run.  
For example, Indonesia, Korea, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand witnessed a 
substantial strengthening of their political institutions. On the Polity IV scale that goes from 
                                                 
22 Rajan (2006) also stresses the potential importance of constituencies relative to institutions. 
However, he puts more emphasis on increasing education as a key lever that develops progrowth 
constituencies. 
23 Keep in mind that this early “Atlantic trade” was much more about commodities than 
manufactures. They key point is who controls the rents and the extent to which these can be seized by 
the state, rather than the precise content of the cargo.   16
one (weak institutions) to seven (strong institutions), Indonesia’s and Taiwan Province of 
China’s by four points, Korea’s by five points, Thailand’s rating improved by six points. 
The possibility that institutional development occurs only when growth is driven by 
manufacturing exports is further suggested by the experience of countries whose exports 
have been natural resource-based. A number of such countries have experienced a surge in 
exports in the aftermath of terms of trade shocks without any commensurate improvement in 
the quality of institutions. In some ways, this is the crux of the natural resource curse. 
As rents to governments increase, there is even less incentive for them to work toward 
improving institutions (Ross, 2001). 
 
E.   Recent Literature on Accelerations and Sustained Growth 
Our approach is closely related to part of the growth literature that has focused on the 
information contained in turning points in countries’ growth performance. This is a 
promising line of research because, by focusing on the correlates of accelerations or 
decelerations in growth, it avoids many of the pitfalls of cross-country growth regressions 
that attempt to explain developing countries’ average growth experience (where the average 
typically confounds periods of steep hills and cliffs, rather than the smooth upward paths 
of the industrial countries—a point emphasized by Pritchett, 2000). The papers by Rodrik 
(1999), Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2004), Jermanowski (2005), and Jones and Olken 
(2005b) represent some initial attempts to uncover the informational content of growth 
transitions, though not surprisingly they conclude that there is a lot we still do not understand 
about the anatomy of growth transitions.   17
Of course, identifying the correlates of accelerations does not directly get at the issue 
of what makes growth sustained. Indeed, it is likely that what ignites growth is not the same 
as what curtails growth (Jones and Olken, 2005b): crises of one type or another, conflict, and 
macroeconomic instability seem to be strongly correlated with the end of growth spells, but 
the converse of these does not appear to be a particularly reliable indicator of what causes an 
acceleration in growth. A more fruitful approach may therefore be to look at the correlates 
of growth duration per se, i.e., once a growth spurt has begun, how can it be kept going? 
Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2006) focus on growth duration, and point out that, 
whereas economically significant increases in growth are relatively common events in the 
developing world (including in Africa), much rarer are the very long sustained spells of the 
type that lifted many countries in East Asia out of poverty over the past few decades. The 
correlates of growth duration should thus have significant policy relevance. The authors use 
survival analysis to relate the probability that a growth spell will end to a variety of economic 
and political variables. They consider the role of democratic institutions, income inequality, 
health and education, external competitiveness, and a number of variables related to 
macroeconomic stability. While their results should probably still be viewed as somewhat 




                                                 
24 Apart from the role mentioned above that inequality appears to play in limiting the duration of 
growth spells, there appears to be a significant effect of high inflation and exchange rate crises as risk 
factors. Reducing inflation from 50 to 10 percent, for example, halves the risk of a downbreak in 
growth in any given year. Sharp currency depreciations (currency crises), following periods of 
significant overvaluation, also appear to be significant predictors of the end of growth spells.   18
III.   RECENT AFRICAN GROWTH EXPERIENCE 
To focus our attention on countries with potential for relatively high sustained 
growth, in the discussion below we divide the countries into two groups based on whether or 
not they attain a minimum threshold of growth over the past decade (Table 1a).
25 We set the 
threshold low, to be as inclusive as possible. We therefore have nineteen African countries 
that had per capita growth over the last decade above 2 percent, and the rest of the region that 
was below this threshold (31 countries for which we have data).  
Table 1a and Appendix Table 9 report basic growth measures for sub-Saharan Africa. 
Column 1 shows GDP per capita growth and column 3 shows total GDP growth. Two points 
are immediately obvious. First, while average GDP growth was respectable over the last 
decade (4.5 percent unweighted and 4.1 percent weighted by population), average GDP per 
capita growth was much lower (2 percent unweighted and only 1.4 percent weighted). 
Column 6 confirms in more detail that population growth remains high in most sub-Saharan 
African countries (there is much less variation across countries in population growth than in 
income growth). The fact that per capita GDP growth is slightly larger than per worker GDP 
growth (column 2) reflects the faster growth in labor force relative to the population, which is 
sometimes characterized as a demographic dividend. 
It is worth noting that average growth rates for the 1990s are even being surpassed 
today. In fact, over the past few years, GDP per capita growth has accelerated. The World 
Economic Outlook growth rate for Africa in 2004 was 3.6 percent and in 2005 it was 3.5 
                                                 
25 Given the discrepancy between the different sources of growth data, we averaged the growth 
numbers for each country from two sources: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and 
the Penn World Tables, version 6.2. However, there is clearly an interesting and important question as 
to the reasons for the deficiencies in African growth data across sources—an issue to which we hope 
to return in the future.   19
percent. The IMF currently expects growth of 3.9 percent in 2006 and 3.7 percent in 2007. 
Per capita growth rates in excess of 2 percent per annum are expected for most regions, 
except the CFA Franc Zone. 
This said, there is a great deal of variation within Africa. Focusing just on per capita 
growth rates, there are a number of countries with growth over 3 percent per annum. Some of 
these countries were recovering from a civil war (Liberia). Others discovered oil (Angola, 
Cape Verde, and Equatorial Guinea.) But five others had growth above or close to 3 percent 
(Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda) and another 
eight countries were around 2 percent. A few countries continue to decline, with Zimbabwe 
as the most notable outlier. 
We turn now to the growth picture in the two groups of SSA countries, The first 
column of Table 1a shows that average growth in Group 1 was 4.8 percent per annum over 
1996–2005. If we exclude Botswana (diamonds and good institutions), Angola, Chad, and 
Equatorial Guinea (oil), Liberia and Rwanda (rebound from civil conflict) and Mauritius (a 
long-standing manufacturing export story and arguably good institutions), average growth 
was 3.1 percent. (We adopt the terms Group 1 and Group 2 for convenience; we are not 
passing judgment on any countries, just trying to look at the data in an informative manner.) 
It is useful to test whether there was a difference in means between the Group 1 
African countries and the SG cases. Specifically, we report the p-value from a t-test where 
the null hypothesis is that there is no difference in means for the two groups.
26 
                                                 
26 The sample for the t-test includes the countries in Group 1 and the 12 SG countries. We report the 
test for two types of comparison. In the first, we compare the means of the Group 1 countries for the 
period 1993-2002 with the corresponding means for SGs at the time of their growth acceleration. In 
the second, we adjust the mean value of a variable for the SGs for the trend increase in that variable 
for the world as a whole. Specifically, we calculate the mean value of the variable for the world 
(continued…)   20
This test shows that if we take the entirety of Group 1, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that their average growth is the same as that that experienced by the Sustained 
Growth cases. But this finding is driven by the presence of a number of outliers (the 
asterisked countries in Table 1a) whose growth reflects oil, rebound from civil conflict, or 
which had reasonably strong institutions to begin with. If we drop those countries, average 
per capita growth was 3.1 percent. This is significantly below what was experienced in our 
Sustained Growth benchmark countries (see Table 1b). 
 
IV.   ARE INSTITUTIONS LIKELY TO BE A CONSTRAINT? 
Table 2a focuses on the Group 1 sub-Saharan African countries with relatively high 
recent growth. The same data are reported for Group 2 in Appendix Table 10. Table 2b 
reports comparable data from our Sustained Growth cases; the notes to this table explain the 
exact time period from which the data are drawn (this is important as much of the relevant 
data is not available for exactly the time of acceleration). 
 
A.   Broad or General Institutions 
The first standard measure captures the quality of broad institutions from the Polity 
dataset. This measure is available for all time periods, so we can look at exactly the time of 
acceleration (or any other time). 
                                                                                                                                                       
sample for 1970 and for the period 1993-2002. We subtract the latter from the former and add this 
difference to the mean for the SGs at time T. The rationale for the second comparison is that the 
improvement in performance of the Group 1 countries might just be due to “grade inflation” which 
may not reflect a true improvement in performance. When the p-value is high it means that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the means for the African group are the same as those of the SGs. 
A low p-value denotes a statistical difference in performance between the two groups.   21
Table 2b shows that constraint on the executive was low in most of the Sustained 
Growth cases at the time of acceleration (we call this time T; the exact date of T is shown in 
the first column of Table 2b.) The average score was 2.2, and 4 of the 12 cases had the lowest 
possible score—Chile, Korea, Thailand and Tunisia. 
In contrast, in the Group 1 of African countries, the average score today is 3.8 and 
only one (Sudan) has the lowest possible score. In terms of political institutions, as reported 
in the second column, most Group 1 African countries already have a higher score than did 
the SG cases when their accelerations began. Institutions are not today very strong, but they 
are potentially good enough in much of Africa so as not to be an obvious constraint on 
sustained growth.
27 It is also noteworthy that levels of inequality today in this group of 
African countries (column 7) is close to the average for the sustained growth countries when 
the latter started their growth spurt. This is promising in light of the finding in Berg, Ostry 
and Zettelmeyer (2006) about the importance of inequality for sustaining growth spurts. It is 
countries in the second group that seem to have high levels of inequality, and hence poorer 
prospects for sustaining growth. 
While comparable measures of the quality of broad economic institutions at the 
beginning of the SG growth accelerations are unavailable, data from Adelman and Morris 
(1971) suggest that countries such as Indonesia, Korea, Thailand and even the Dominican 
Republic had improved their economic institutions substantially during the growth period. 
For example, Korea and Thailand that were ranked below the mean on "administrative 
efficiency" in 1960 saw their investment rating rise to about 1.5 and 2 standard deviations 
above the mean, respectively on a measure of investment risk in 1984. While less dramatic,   22
Indonesia and the Dominican Republic also saw improvements in their institutions by 1984, 
with both countries moving from below average to substantially above average ratings on 
these measures. Available data are not good enough to ascertain the exact timing of these 
improvements but it appears that in the preponderance of Sustained Growth cases, the 
improvement in economic institutions happened relatively early in the growth acceleration. 
The World Bank (1993) has noted that China's investment climate improved dramatically 
and relatively early during its growth acceleration.  
For this reason, when the broad measures of economic institutions begin, in the mid-
1980s, the scores for countries that accelerated in the 1960s are already good. The average 
score for Economic Risk (a composite indicator that contains the leading dimensions of 
economic institutions, such as corruption and rule of law) was 31.7 (out of 50), while for 
Investment Risk (an alternative measure) it was 7.1 (out of 12).   
Note that for China and Vietnam, data from the mid-1980s are at or close to the time 
of acceleration (1978 for China and 1985 for Vietnam). Vietnam had a relatively low (i.e., 
bad) score, of 5.0, at that time, while China was already at a relatively high 8.6 in terms of 
Investment Risk. 
Remarkably, our Group 1 African countries have an average Economic Risk indicator 
of 31.7 and an Investment Risk just above 8. There is nothing here to indicate that broad 
economic institutions are worse in this part of Africa today than they were 20 years ago in 
our Sustained Growth cases. Most likely, many of the Sustained Growth cases began their 
accelerations with broad economic institutions that were no better than in much of Africa 
today. 
                                                                                                                                                       
27 Indeed, the p-value for the t-test of similar political institutions between Group 1 countries and the 
(continued…)   23
The story in terms of control of corruption is more complicated. Column 6 in Table 
2a shows the Kaufmann-Kraay index, which is out of 6 (higher is less corrupt), and which is 
normalized. In other words, our corruption measure is relative, while our other measures of 
broad institutions are in absolute terms, i.e., everyone can improve in terms of the latter but 
not the former. These data are only available from the mid-1990s.
28 
Of the sustained growth cases, half of the countries had corruption scores of 3 or 
below in the mid-1990s. This is not very different from the preponderance of Group 1 
African countries as of 2005. No doubt corruption is an important issue in many countries, 
but it does not appear to prevent growth. Nor does controlling corruption necessarily lead to 
growth.  
In terms of testing for differences in means, we find no difference in the adjusted 
broad measures, but we do find Group 1 has significantly higher corruption than was the case 




B.   Costs of Doing Business 
One area worthy of further attention relates to businesses’ costs of entry (the units 
here are hours of time and fraction of income per capita per annum) and to the costs of 
trading. These data are from the World Bank’s Doing Business database. These are plausible 
measures for the specific institutions that directly impact business. 
                                                                                                                                                       
SGs is rejected, but in the direction of suggesting that the former had significantly better institutions. 
28 The original Kaufmann-Kraay index, which is a measure of relative performance, ranges from 
minus 2.5 to plus 2.5. Our transformation changes the range from 1 to 6, which we achieve by adding 
3.5 to the original value.   24
In contrast to the measures of broad institutions, where the Group 1 African countries 
do well relative to other countries, in terms of these more micro measures, the picture is 
mixed.
30  
It is very surprising that the time for paying taxes is actually lower than in the SG 
cases today (average of 229 hours in the Group 1 African countries vs. 348 in the Sustained 
Growth cases). On the total amount of tax payable, the Group 1 African countries rank about 
the same as the SG cases—45 percent of gross profits on average. 
It is on the costs of entry, i.e., registering a new business, that African countries do 
worse than the SGs as well as the average developing country. In the average Group 1 
country, costs are about 123 percent (measured in terms of per capita income) compared with 
25 percent in the SGs and 78 percent in the average developing country. The t-test for 
differences in means confirms that Africa has a disadvantage in this category. 
While there is a presumption that macro and micro institutions should broadly co-
move, there can clearly be exceptions. One possibility is that macro and micro institutions 
could be measuring distinct functions that institutions perform. For example, while broad 
institutions such as the judiciary will determine the protection of property rights and 
enforcement of contracts, the costs of doing business measured at the micro-level could relate 
to ease of acquiring specific licenses, which could be the domain of other administrative 
institutions/authorities. Another explanation for the lack of co-movement could simply be 
time. Even where, say, laws and regulations relating to property rights can be relatively 
                                                                                                                                                       
29 In an earlier version of this paper, the sample of Group I countries was slightly different but that did 
not alter the basic conclusions that we obtain for the sample used in this version. 
30 Comparisons between African countries and SG cases in relation to the costs of doing business 
should be treated more cautiously because, unlike in the rest of the paper, countries are being 
compared at the same point in real time and not the same point in “acceleration” time.   25
easily changed, their effective enforcement (which would be picked up at the micro-level) 
may take more time.  
Finally, the measurement of micro-institutions has not yet acquired the prominence of 
their macro counterparts. Further work is required to understand the differences between 
macro and micro differences, and what policy levers are available to countries to remedy the 
high costs of trading and doing business more generally. 
 
C.   Conflict and Fractionalization 
It is possible that while broad institutions in Africa are at reasonable levels, the 
problem could be the potential for, or actual, conflict. Wars of various kinds definitely have 
been an issue in Africa’s recent past. 
Tables 3a, 3b, and Appendix Table 11 explore this issue in more detail, using data 
from the Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset. Interestingly, what we find here is that in terms of 
“all conflicts,” Group 1 African countries are not significantly worse than were the SG 
countries at the start of their growth. 
Looking at interstate conflicts, in the window of T-9 to T, there was actually less 
conflict in the Group 1 countries than in the Sustained Growth cases. However, in terms of 
internal conflict, there appears to have been more in Africa—most of this has been 
concentrated in a few countries, but it has still spilled out into wider regions (e.g. Sudan-
Chad, Liberia-Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and several neighbors.) The 
potential for more intense and disruptive conflict in Africa should not be discounted. 
In Tables 4a, 4b, and Appendix Table 12, we present various measures of societal 
fractionalization, which is an indicator of the potential for conflict. Societies can potentially   26
fracture along different lines—ethnic, religious, or linguistic. These tables indicate that 
regardless of the measure, all African countries (Groups 1 and 2) fare significantly worse 
than the SG cases. While the widely-noted reduction in internal African conflicts over the 
last decade offers some basis for optimism, the divided nature of many of these countries 
should serve to temper such optimism. 
 
V.   TRADE OUTCOMES AND POLICIES 
Tables 5a and 5b look in more detail at trade outcomes and trade policies. Apart from 
micro institutions that may have hampered the export orientation of a number of African 
countries, trade policies—as well as the exchange rate to which we turn later—are other 
possible candidates. 
 
A.   Export Performance 
The Sustained Growth cases generally attained great success in manufacturing 
exports. The average increase in the ratio of manufacturing exports to GDP for this group 
over their growth episode was 36 percentage points. For example, Singapore and, to a lesser 
extent, Korea and Malaysia, achieved a rapid increase in manufacturing exports at a very 
early stage: within the first five years of the growth spurt, the share of manufactured exports 
in GDP had risen by 7.3 percentage points for Singapore, and by about 2.5 percentage points 
for the other two countries. Clearly, there was two-way causality between export ratios and 
growth, but even to the extent that early rapid export growth was a proximate cause, it raises 
the question as to the underlying policy choices that facilitated this growth.   27
The average export-GDP ratio is quite high in the Group 1 African countries—their 
average ratio of 31 percent is almost double that of the Sustained Growth cases at the time of 
their accelerations (19 percent). The Group 1 numbers are high in part because of Botswana 
(diamonds), Equatorial Guinea (oil), Mauritius (clothing) and Lesotho (clothing). Even if we 
drop the asterisked countries in Table 5a, the average remains at 25 percent, which is still 
high. 
In terms of manufactured exports too, African countries do not start at a very great 
disadvantage compared to the SGs. Even after excluding the few African countries with high 
levels of manufactured exports relative to GDP (Botswana, Lesotho, and Mauritius), in most 
cases the ratio of manufactured exports to GDP is close to what it was for the SGs.  
This picture is similar if we focus on apparel, footwear, and textile exports—the 
traditional starting point for countries that export manufactures. Aside from Lesotho and 
Mauritius (and Swaziland, which is in the Group 2 countries), these exports are small at less 
than 0.5 percent of GDP but this was also true of the SGs.  
The SGs, however, increased their manufactured exports dramatically. Table 5a 
seems to suggest that, at least during the last ten years, there has not been any significant 
improvement in manufacturing or textiles exports from Africa. The question is whether the 
current policy environment is conducive to SSA countries repeating the feat of the SGs over 
the medium term. On the one hand, the external trading environment facing SSA countries is 
more difficult now because of the competition from Asian exporters, particularly China, 
India, and Vietnam. On the other, SSA exporters face virtually duty-free access to the 
markets of industrial countries in manufactures thanks to the various preferential schemes in 
the European Union (Everything But Arms) and the United States (The Africa Growth and    28
Opportunity Act) whereas barriers facing Asian exporters in the 1960 and 1970s were much 
higher than today.
31 On balance, it is therefore difficult to assess whether today’s 
environment is actually more difficult for the SSA countries.  
 
B.   Trade Liberalization 
Countries do seem to become more open as they grow and this is borne out by the 
experience of the SGs. While it is true that some countries in the SG group did not liberalize 
(and to some degree still have not—e.g., China and Vietnam), the weight of the evidence 
points in a different direction, as the examples of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Taiwan Province of China show. In terms of the aggregate data, the average percent of years 
that a country has been open (since the growth acceleration began) is 58 percent for the 
Sustained Growth cases.  
The (perhaps) surprising fact is that many African countries are quite liberal on trade. 
Table 5a shows that the augmented Sachs-Warner measure for the Group 1 countries is 0.6 
(out of 1, with higher meaning more liberal).
32 They are more open than the SGs were at the 
comparable stage of their growth spurt (0.4 is the average on the SW measure for the SGs), 
and they are more open than the average developing country today (0.5 on the SW measure).  
 
                                                 
31 Of course, some of this duty-free access is undermined by onerous rules of origin (Mattoo et. al., 
2003) 
32 The Sachs-Warner measure is a broad measure of trade liberalization and incorporates data on 
tariffs, quantitative restrictions (QRs), black market premium, export marketing boards, and whether 
a country has a socialist regime. This measure was updated by Wacziarg and Welch (2003). 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) criticize the results obtained by Sachs and Warner (1995) based on their 
measure on the grounds that it captures not just trade but a variety of macroeconomic and institutional 
factors. They also showed that it was the black market premium component of the indicator that was 
driving the results rather than tariffs and QRs.    29
C.   Exchange Rate Overvaluation 
Anecdotally, one important factor that supported export growth in the SG cases was 
the avoidance of exchange rate overvaluation.
33 While this is hard to measure exactly, we 
have constructed the following, relatively standard, proxy for overvaluation. 
First, following Frankel (2004), for every year beginning in 1960, we ran a cross-
section regression of the log of a country’s price level relative to the United States (available 
in the Penn World Tables) on the country’s per capita GDP in PPP terms. This equation 
captures (in a cross-section context) the Balassa-Samuelson effect, which predicts that as 
countries grow richer, the real exchange rate—measured by the price level relative to the 
United States—should appreciate. The predicted value of the real exchange rate from this 
regression provides a sense of equilibrium, while the difference between the predicted and 
actual real exchange rate is a measure of overvaluation.
34 
We look at average currency overvaluation (last 5 years for which data are available 
for the African countries and for the entire duration of the growth episode for the SG cases), 
                                                 
33 Conditions for success in global markets might be slightly different today than in the 1960s and 
1970s, when the Asian countries succeeded: for example, reputation (for quality and reliability) has 
become very important in today’s manufacturing based on global production chains. Hence, a 
competitive exchange rate is by no means sufficient to guarantee export success. 
34 We estimate the following cross-section equation for every year since 1960 for the sample of all 
countries: log log i i i py α βε =+ + where p is the log of the price level for country i in terms of the 
United States, and y the level of per capita PPP GDP. Our measure of overvaluation is then: 
log ( log ). i ii overval p y αβ =− + $$  We average this measure for each country over the relevant time period. 
Clearly, there are alternative ways of measuring overvaluation that are parsimonious in only 
considering relative income as a determinant of real exchange rates. But the key point is that here the 
relationship is estimated over the very long run—in effect when we run the annual cross-sectional 
regression, what we are assuming is that PPP will apply over the very long run, spanning the period 
over which the United States and other OECD countries have become rich and others have not. 
Implicitly, the timeframe for estimating the PPP relationship is 300-400 years. 
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the longest consecutive spell of overvaluation, and the extent of overvaluation during that 
spell (Table 6).
35 
Almost all the sustained growth cases avoided overvaluation during the growth 
period, with some (Indonesia and Thailand) exhibiting substantial undervaluation. The 
average degree of overvaluation for the SGs was minus 18 percent (i.e. these countries’ 
exchange rate was substantially undervalued) compared with an average overvaluation of 
7 percent for the Group 1 countries and 18 percent for Group 2 African countries.
36  
On average in the Group 1 African countries, there either is now or has been 
substantial overvaluation in almost all cases, although today this problem is less marked on 
average. The degree and extent of overvaluation in Group 2 countries has been even greater 
(on average 20 percent or so in recent years).  
Another indicator is to see how long and how large have been “spells”—consecutive 
periods—of overvaluation. Spells can be important especially if there are hysteresis effects 
and fixed costs of adjustment. In the SG cases, the average duration of the longest spell was 
6.4 years, while for Group 1 countries it is 13 years and for the Group 2 countries is 15 years. 
During this spell, the average amount of overvaluation was 11 percent for the average SG 
country, while it was 37 percent for the average African country. Thus, the striking finding is 
that the average African country is likely to have persistent overvaluation that is twice as 
long as for the average SG country and that is almost three times as large in magnitude. On 
nearly all the measures of overvaluation—average, duration and persistence—the SSA 
countries and Group 1 countries are significantly worse off than the SGs at a comparable 
                                                 
35 Spells of overvaluation are consecutive periods for which our measure of overvaluation is positive.   31
point in time (the statistical tests reject the hypothesis that the overvaluation measures for 
Group 1 countries and SGs are similar). 
If development, and in the case of Africa, diversification, is about creating the 
incentives to invest in the tradable goods sector, and given the inability and unwillingness of 
African country governments to pursue interventionist industrial policy, the exchange rate 
becomes a key instrument in promoting this objective. The question then arises as to the 
feasibility of sustaining a competitive exchange rate.  
The real exchange rate is not an easy policy lever for at least two reasons. First, the 
fact that changes in the real exchange rate have serious distributional consequences, 
especially in Africa (Bates, 1981), suggests a role for deeper, political economy factors 
constraining choices on the exchange rate. Second, the ability of countries in East Asia as 
well as China and India (and Tunisia) to sustain a competitive exchange rate has been helped 
by their caution in opening up to capital flows (see Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian, 2006). 
Latin America has witnessed periodic bouts of currency appreciation driven by surges in 
capital flows. While Africa has not witnessed private flows, it too has seen large inflows in 
the form of aid, which puts upward pressure on the exchange rate.
37 Reconciling the tension 
between the need for a competitive exchange rate and the constrained ability to achieve it (in 
                                                                                                                                                       
36 It is noteworthy that the Sustained Growth countries avoided overvaluation even in cases where 
there were substantial aid inflows (e.g., Indonesia, in the 10 year window around its acceleration, had 
aid-to-GDP of 24 percent). 
37 Aid-to-GDP at current levels is high compared to the initial starting point of most SG cases, though 
it is lower than the aid levels received by Indonesia at the time its takeoff, suggesting perhaps that the 
present level of aid should not inevitably constrain, one way or another, these countries’ ability to 
enjoy sustained growth. While, Rajan and Subramanian (2005) provide evidence that aid and the 
consequent exchange rate overvaluation have a significant negative effect on exports of manufactures, 
it is possible that countries can mitigate the adverse effects through policy changes, such as 
improvements aimed at enhancing productive efficiency.   32
light of the political economy and aid factors) will remain a major challenge for African 
countries. 
 
D.   Costs of Importing and Exporting 
While the Group 1 countries in SSA are comparable to—or even better than—other 
developing countries on broad measures of trade policy (the trade restrictiveness rankings 
and Sachs-Warner openness measures), they seem to do distinctly worse on the more micro 
measures of the costs of trading (Tables 7a and 7b).  
For example, in the average Group 1 country it takes about 12 documents and 57 days 
to undertake imports: these numbers are of course vastly superior today in the SGs (the 
comparable numbers are 9 and 21 respectively); more strikingly, these numbers are also 
inferior to the average developing country where it takes 11 documents and only 37 days, 
the latter being about 25 percent better than for the average Group 1 country. There is a 
similar difference on the export side.  
The fact that African countries do worse than the average developing country is not 
surprising, but what is interesting is that this discrepancy is not reflected in the broader 
measures of trade policy, where as discussed earlier, the average African country does, 
if anything, marginally better. 
Here again, we see a difference between macro and micro measures. In this case, it is 
possible that the macro measures are too coarse, and hence are less informative than the 
micro measures. Or, it could be the case that, while broad policy reform has taken place, 
implementation lags behind. Either way, though, these figures suggest some scope for 
remedial action to improve the micro-environment for importing and exporting.   33
 
VI.   OTHER POTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS 
A.   Education 
The educational attainment measures are gross primary and secondary enrollment 
ratios at the time of the growth spurt (from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators); see Tables 8a and 8b. For example, the average enrollment ratio in primary 
education for the Group 1 countries was 91 compared with 95 for the SGs. Indeed, the 
comparable figures for secondary education (32 and 36 percent, respectively) show Group 1 
countries as being comparable to the SGs. Of course, it must be kept in mind that these 
measures do not adjust for the quality of education. 
 
B.   Health and Infrastructure 
Without a doubt, there are some difficult health problems in Africa today. Rates of 
HIV/AIDS infections may have been revised downwards recently, but this still remains a 
major issue in many countries, particularly in southern Africa. One important measure 
of health is life expectancy. 
We report data for two years: the latest available and 1982. We include 1982 so as to 
have a measure from before the HIV/AIDS epidemic became widespread, i.e., we are looking 
for evidence that health has become more of a constraint over the past 20 years. Note that life 
expectancy has not declined everywhere in Africa over this time period, but there have been 
dramatic and shocking declines in some countries (particularly in southern Africa.) 
Life expectancy in Group 1 was 49.6 years in 1982 and 48.2 years in the most 
recently available data. Some countries (with rapid growth currently) in this group have very   34
low life expectancy—for example, 42 years in Ethiopia and Mozambique. Average life 
expectancy in Group 2 is similar (50.9 years in 1982 and 48.8 years today). These figures are 
significantly poorer than those for the SGs at the start of their growth episodes. 
The only Sustained Growth country with such low life expectancy at the start of its 
acceleration was Indonesia—Table 8b shows that this was 46 in 1967. However, a number 
of other SG cases started with life expectancy in the low 50s (e.g., Egypt, Korea, Thailand, 
and Tunisia; India too had a life expectancy of 54 in the early 1980s). 
Health in Africa definitely needs to improve, but the jury is out on whether this 
constitutes a binding constraint on sustained growth. Bad health may prevent growth from 
accelerating, for example because it limits effort. But there is no clear theory of why ill-
health would allow accelerations but not sustained growth.
38 In addition, the available 
evidence suggests that while improving health can definitely increase incomes, the size of the 
effect is small (see the discussion in Acemoglu and Johnson, 2006). 
We are not suggesting that the African health sector does not need further investment. 
It is hard to find comparable data on inputs into the health system, as measures of spending 
are either not available or are difficult to compare across income levels. However, number of 
doctors is a reasonable proxy for the scope of the health system. Column 5 of Table 8a shows 
that the Group 1 countries have on average only 150 physicians per million inhabitants, and 
this falls to 88 per million if we exclude the exceptional starred cases. This is low by any 
standards. Efforts to provide more international assistance for health care in Africa seem well 
placed; the historical evidence suggests that this spending could save many lives and 
                                                 
38 This would need a mechanism through which growth worsens health sufficiently to prevent further 
investments in human capital. Alternatively, people might be willing to acquire basic skills (for an 
(continued…)   35
significantly reduce ill health (see the post-World War II experience, reviewed in Acemoglu 
and Johnson, 2006.) 
Again, Table 8b shows that the availability of physicians was much higher in many 
SG cases, e.g., Korea already had 600 per million people at the time of its acceleration. But 
some SGs had poor health systems when they started to grow rapidly. According to this 
indicator—Indonesia had 37.3 and Thailand had 129 doctors per million, which are 
comparable to the numbers in many African countries. 
A closely related argument is that Africa more broadly lacks the basic infrastructure 
to develop. Again, it is hard to find comparable measures, but telephone mainlines and roads 
are two rough but reasonable proxies for infrastructure. On both these measures, many of the 
SG cases were worse off when they started to grow than Africa is today. For example, China, 
Vietnam and Indonesia had two or fewer mainlines per 1,000 people. (Table 8c indicates that 
these data are available only from the mid-1970s; this is therefore informative about 
conditions when China and Vietnam started to accelerate, but Indonesia had already been 
growing for 10 years when it still only had 1.5 mainlines per 1,000). 
Roads are harder to compare, because we would need to adjust for mountainous or 
desert terrain, as well as the quality of the road surface. Also, these data are not available 
before 1990. Still they indicate that roads per surface area in the Sustained Growth cases 
were not generally much more developed that in the Group 1 African countries (with the 
notable exception of Singapore.) For example, road infrastructure in Indonesia and Thailand 
(in 1990) was quite comparable to many African countries (today). The t-test indicates no 
                                                                                                                                                       
acceleration) but not more advanced skills (to sustain growth). In the British Industrial Revolution, 
perhaps for 50 years during the nineteenth century, health probably worsened, yet growth continued.   36
significant difference in means for Group 1 African countries and the sustained growth cases 
in terms of roads. 
Overall, while more infrastructures are presumably better than less, there is no 
evidence that the Sustained Growth countries took off after a massive push in terms of public 
investment (including health). They may have been slightly healthier than Africa today, but 
their overall infrastructure was at comparable levels. 
Africa is often compared with Korea in the 1950s or 1960s, but this may be 
misleading. In part because of the Korea war and associated U.S. military-related 
investments (e.g., in roads), Korea may have had an unusual starting point. Perhaps a 
comparison with Indonesia in the mid-1960s is more instructive. In this regard, at least the 
Group 1 African countries have no significant disadvantage. 
 
VII.   CONCLUSIONS 
For those who view Africa’s prospects through the perspective of the “deep” 
determinants of development—geography, institutions and history—the outlook seems bleak. 
For others, the outlook appears rosier, either because of the current commodity-powered 
upturn or because of a faith that pulling certain policy levers (especially foreign aid) will 
deliver strong results. Both these views are far from persuasive. Extrapolating the recent past 
is a cardinal sin of forecasting, especially since Africa has seen many a false dawn of 
commodity booms turning bust. And foreign aid has had disappointing effects in the past. 
But implicit in these assessments has been a comparison of Africa with its own past 
or Africa with other countries today. The contribution of this paper has been to look at the 
evidence differently. We compared Africa today with countries that were similarly weak in   37
the past—in terms of their institutional development—and yet managed to escape from 
poverty. Looking at the data suggests (but does not prove) that these “deep” indicators, 
especially for a group of “promising” African countries, are not much worse in Africa today 
than they were in much of East Asia in the early 1960s (e.g., Indonesia and Thailand) or in 
Vietnam and China circa 1980. There are inherited institutional weaknesses in Africa—and 
internal conflict and societal fractionalization remain concerns—but the East Asian 
experience definitely demonstrates that some institutional weaknesses can be escaped. So the 
good news is that breaking away from a country’s institutional legacy is possible because it 
has been done by others, including some East Asian countries which were not that dissimilar 
from some promising performers in Africa today.  
But when we turn from the deep “why” to the proximate “how” question, we find that 
since the 1960s, escapes from poverty in the face of weak institutions have generally 
involved exports and—in almost all cases—manufacturing exports. Africa need not, of 
course, take exactly the same route, but a stronger and more dynamic manufacturing export 
sector would surely help sustain growth. To achieve this, though, reducing the direct 
regulatory costs for exporters and avoiding real exchange rate overvaluation will be essential. 
And on these scores, we see risks going forward that were less of an issue for the east Asian 
escapees: commodity-based growth and sizable aid inflows—that partly underpin the rosier 
prognosis for Africa—can be pitfalls for institutional development and the avoidance of real 
exchange rate overvaluation. Sub-Saharan Africa’s escape from poverty, while certainly 
possible, may be more challenging than it was for east Asia. Clearly, fatalism is unwarranted 
but the means of escape need to be found.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Group 1: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth >= 2.0 percent
Angola* 4.7 4.7 7.9 1,857 11,880 2.6 14.2
Botswana* 4.6 4.1 5.7 7,809 6,190 0.9 1.8
Burkina Faso 2.0 2.1 4.7 1,024 3,380 3.0 11.5
Cameroon 2.0 1.8 4.3 1,875 11,611 2.0 15.0
Cape Verde 4.2 4.4 5.6 4,816 658 2.3 0.5
Chad* 2.4 2.3 8.2 1,055 2,390 3.3 8.4
Equatorial Guinea* 24.3 24.2 23.2 9,172 1,649 2.3 0.5
Ethiopia 1.8 2.0 5.0 796 8,390 2.3 64.9
Ghana 2.1 2.4 4.7 1,918 7,300 2.2 20.1
Guinea 2.4 2.2 3.6 1,975 3,420 2.2 8.5
Lesotho 3.3 2.8 2.9 2,220 1,006 0.6 1.8
Liberia* 9.4 9.5 18.0 n.a. 441 4.3 3.0
Mali 2.8 2.4 5.7 832 3,300 2.9 11.9
Mauritius* 3.8 4.4 4.7 9,745 4,820 1.1 1.2
Mozambique 4.7 4.4 8.5 946 4,300 2.2 18.1
Rwanda* 6.1 6.8 7.5 1,096 1,800 5.1 7.8
Sudan* 2.3 2.8 6.3 1,656 15,070 2.1 33.2
Tanzania 5.1 5.4 5.5 549 9,250 2.1 35.1
Uganda 3.6 3.4 6.0 1,238 6,410 3.2 25.0
Average 4.8 4.9 7.3 2,810 5,435 2.5 14.9
Average (excl. * countries) 3.1 3.0 5.1 1,654 5,366 2.3 19.3
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 equals 
mean for SGs
0.98 0.77 ... ... ... ... ...
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 (excl. 
asterisked countries) equals mean for SGs
0.00 0.04 ... ... ... ... ...
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0%
Average 0.04 0.37 2.7 2,533 10,329 2.5 13.6
Average (excl. * countries in group 2) 0.24 0.52 2.6 2,756 11,182 2.4 12.9
Average Sub-Saharan Africa 2.0 2.1 4.5 2,644 8,350 2.4 14.1
Weighted Average Sub-Saharan Africa
2 1.44 1.51 4.1 1,720 … 2.4 …
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI, November 2006 download), unless otherwise indicated.
1/ All variables are averages for the period 1996-2005, unless otherwise indicated.
2/ Weighted by population.
3/ Real per Capita GDP Growth is  the average of  WDI and Penn World Table's estimates for the period 1995-2004.
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PPP Real GDP Per 
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Real Per Worker 
GDP Growth
4
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Chile 1986 4.35 6.01 5,018 11,301 120,000 1.5 16.3 3.86
China,P.R.: Mainland 1978 8.41 9.73 674 5,878 2,200,000 1.2 1304.5 8.82
Dominican Republic 1969 3.23 5.35 3,335 6,779 28,000 2.0 8.9 4.83
Egypt 1976 3.46 5.61 1,742 3,985 89,000 2.1 74.0 3.46
Indonesia 1967 3.96 6.14 1,099 3,437 290,000 1.9 220.6 2.73
Korea 1962 5.97 7.33 3,498 19,560 790,000 1.4 48.3 5.21
Malaysia 1970 4.50 6.66 2,998 9,699 130,000 2.4 25.3 4.04
Singapore 1969 5.21 7.75 6,536 26,764 120,000 2.1 4.4 3.07
Taiwan Province of China 1961 6.30 n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Thailand 1960 4.69 6.69 1,899 7,649 180,000 2.0 64.2 2.46
Tunisia 1968 3.40 5.28 3,415 7,423 29,000 1.9 10.0 4.72
Vietnam 1985 4.68 6.72 n.a. 2,739 52,000 1.7 83.0 5.95
Average … 4.8 6.7 3,021.5 9,564.7 366,181.8 1.8 169.0 4.5
Weighted Average
2 … 7.1 8.6 977 5,877 1,559,704 1.39 … 7.1
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI, November 2006 download), unless otherwise indicated.
1/ The variables are averages for the period T to 2005, unless otherwise indicated,  where T refers to the start of the growth episode.
2/ Weighted by population.
3/ Real per Capita GDP Growth is  the average of  WDI and Penn World Table's estimates for the period 1995-2004.
4/ GDP is measured in national currency terms. Growth rates are averages for the period T (the start of the growth episode) to L (2005), the latest year for which data are available.
5/ The latest year is 2005.  
  
 


























(in hours per 
year)
Total Amount 
of Tax Payable  
(as a percentage 
of gross profits) 
Costs of Entry 
(measured in 
% per capita 
income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Group 1: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth >= 2.0%
Angola* 5.1 3 28.0 7.67 2.0 n.a. 272 64 487
Botswana* 4.8 7 39.3 10.83 3.0 63 140 53 11
Burkina Faso 1.6 3 28.3 9 2.0 40 270 51 121
Cameroon 2.1 2 37.7 8 2.0 45 n.a. 46 152
Cape Verde 3.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.8 n.a. 100 54 46
Chad* 4.8 2 n.a. n.a. 2.4 n.a. 122 68 226
Equatorial Guinea* 20.3 2 n.a. n.a. 1.9 n.a. 212 62 101
Ethiopia 2.6 3 32.5 7 2.0 30 212 33 46
Ghana 2.4 6 29.1 8.5 2.0 41 304 32 50
Guinea 1.3 3 34.0 5 2.5 40 416 49 187
Lesotho 2.3 7 n.a. n.a. 3.5 63 352 26 40
Liberia* 12.4 n.a. 31.6 5.0 2.0 n.a.
Mali 2.7 5 24.0 7.5 2.0 51 270 50 202
Mauritius* 3.6 7 n.a. n.a. 3.8 n.a. 158 25 8
Mozambique 6.1 4 25.5 8.67 1.5 40 230 39 86
Rwanda* 2.2 3 n.a. n.a. 3.1 n.a. 168 41 188
Sudan* 4.1 1 34.0 7.5 2.5 n.a. 180 37 59
Tanzania 3.2 3 34.5 11.5 3.0 35 248 45 92
Uganda 2.6 3 33.5 8 2.5 43 237 32 114
Average 4.6 3.8 31.7 8.0 2.5 44.5 228.9 45.0 122.9
Average (excl. * countries) 2.8 3.9 31.0 8.1 2.4 43 264 42 103
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 (excl. asterisked 
countries) equals mean for SGs 0.00 0.01 0.78 0.27 0.01 0.43 0.30 0.62 0.00
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 equals adjusted mean 
for SGs
9 … 0.04 2.29 0.27 … … … … …
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 (excl. asterisked 
countries) equals adjusted mean for SGs
9 … 0.03 0.10 0.35 … … … … …
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0%
Average 0.22 4.0 29.9 7.2 1.7 49.0 331 87 153
Average (excl. * countries) 0.24 4.0 30.4 7.1 1.7 49.0 318.1 74.7 137.9
Average, 1980 (excl. * countries in group 2)
10 … 2.6 26.6 5.4 … … … … …
Sustained Growth Countries (SGs) 4.9 2.2 31.7 7.1 3.4 39.5 348 44 25
Developing world …… … … … … 283.7 55.2 77.6
Sources: WDI (November 2006 download), ICRG, Polity IV, and World Bank Doing Business websites.
1/ Data are for the most recent 10 year period available, except for the sustained growth countries (SGs). Asterisk denote countries with strong initial institutions or
those recovering from conflict or experiencing a commodity boom.
2/ The data from WDI. For SGs, data refer to the average for the period T to L, where T refers to the start of the growth episode and L the latest year (2005).
3/ Score ranges from 1 to 7. The higher the score the more the constraints on the executive. The data refer to year 2004 for SSA countries, and  to the period T for SGs.
4/ Score for economic risk ranges from 1 to 50.  The higher the score the lower the risk. For SGs data refer to 1984,  and for SSA economic risk to 2002.
5/ Score investment risk ranges from 1 to 12. For SGs data refer to 1996, and for SSA to 2006.
6/ Score ranges from 1 to 6. The higher the score the less the corruption. For SGs data refer to 1996, and for SSA to 2004 or 2005.
7/ For SGs, data refer to T or to the year closest to T for which data are available (see table 8c)
8/ The data are from the World Bank Doing Business websites:  "http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/PayingTaxes/".  Data for all the countries 
including SGs are for the most recent period based on the survey of January 2006.
9/ Mean for SGs adjusted by adding the change in world mean between 1970 and the average for the period 1996-2005. Year 1985 is used for Chad.
10/  1: For constraint on the Executive, Namibia is excluded since the earliest data on it is 1990; 
       2: For Economic risk and Investment risk, the averages are for year 1985. Namibia is exlcuded since the earliest data available on them are 1990.












































(in hours per 
year)
Total Amount of 
Tax Payable  (as 
a percentage of 
gross profits) 
Costs of Entry 
(measured in % 
per capita 
income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Chile 1986 4.4 1.0 22.2 2.7 3.8 55.7 432 26.3 9.8
China,P.R.: Mainland 1978 8.5 3.0 35.5 8.6 2.0 21.2 872 77.1 9.3
Dominican Republic 1969 3.2 3.0 26.2 4.3 3.3 45.5 178 67.9 30.2
Egypt 1976 3.4 3.0 28.6 6.3 2.1 33.0 536 50.4 68.8
Indonesia 1967 4.2 2.0 30.1 6.5 3.0 32.7 576 37.2 86.7
Korea 1962 5.8 1.0 34.8 9.8 5.0 32.0 290 30.9 15.2
Malaysia 1970 4.1 3.0 37.5 7.5 4.0 51.3 190 35.2 19.7
Singapore 1969 5.5 3.0 39.5 10.8 4.0 40.0 30 28.8 0.8
Taiwan Province of China 1961 6.8 2.0 40.6 10.0 4.0 31.7 n.a. 35.8 4.6
Thailand 1960 4.6 1.0 35.2 8.0 3.0 46.6 104 40.2 5.8
Tunisia 1968 3.3 1.0 30.3 5.3 3.0 48.5 268 58.8 9.3
Vietnam 1985 4.9 3.0 20.0 5.2 3.0 35.7 n.a. 41.6 44.5
Average … 4.9 2.2 31.7 7.1 3.4 39.5 347.6 44.2 25.4
Developing world …… … … … … … 283.7 55.2 77.6
Sources: WDI (November 2006 download), ICRG, Polity IV, and World Bank Doing Business websites.
1/ Data refer to the start (T) of the growth episode, unless otherwise specified.
2/ Average for the period T to L, where T refers to the start of the growth episode and L the latest year (2005).
3/ Data refer to the period T. Score ranges from 1 to 7. The higher the score the more the constraints on the executive.
4/ Data refer to the mid-1980s (1984).  Score for economic risk ranges from 1 to 50, and for investment risk from 1-12. The higher the score the lower the risk.
5/  Data refer to the mid-1990s (1996). Score ranges from 1 to 6.  The higher the score the less the corruption.
6/ For SGs, data refer to T or to the year closest to T for which data are available (see table 8c)
7/ The data are from the World Bank Doing Business websites:  "http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/PayingTaxes/".  Data for all the countries 
     including SGs are for the most recent period based on the survey of January 2006.
Economic Institutions. Costs of Doing Business
7 
 
Table 3a. Indicators for Selected sub-Saharan African Countries: Conflicts
1 
 
Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max
Group 1: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth >= 2.0%
Angola* 2.1 3.0 2.7 3.0 0.8 3.0 1.9 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Botswana* 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Burkina Faso 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cameroon 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.0
Cape Verde 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chad* 1.4 3.0 1.2 3.0 0.7 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equatorial Guinea* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ethiopia 1.7 3.0 1.4 3.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 3.0 1.0 3.0 0.9 3.0
Ghana 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Guinea 0.8 3.0 0.6 3.0 0.2 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lesotho 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Liberia* 0.7 3.0 1.2 3.0 0.7 3.0 1.2 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mali 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mauritius* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mozambique 0.0 0.0 0.6 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rwanda* 2.0 3.0 2.3 3.0 1.4 3.0 1.8 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sudan* 3.0 3.0 2.8 3.0 2.9 3.0 2.8 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tanzania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uganda 2.6 3.0 2.1 3.0 2.1 3.0 1.7 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Average 0.8 1.4 0.8 1.6 0.5 3.0 0.6 3.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 3.0
Average (excl. * countries) 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 1.0 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4
Average, 1980  (excl. * countries) 0.4 0.4 0.0
T-test: mean for Group 1 equals 
mean for SGs
0.42 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00
T-test: mean for Group 1 (excl. 
asterisked countries) equals mean for 
SGs
0.82 0.31 0.96 0.45 0.15 0.26 0.19 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 
equals adjusted mean for SGs
3
0.64 0.53 0.78 0.56 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.40 0.01 0.14 0.00
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 
(excl. asterisked countries) equals 
adjusted mean for SGs
3
0.94 0.31 0.70 0.45 0.30 0.26 0.38 0.11 0.58 0.02 0.23 0.01
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0%
Average 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4
Average, 1980
4 0.2 … … … 0.2 … … … 0.0 … … …
Sustained Growth Countries (SGs)
0.5 1.8 0.6 1.9 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.6 0.5 1.8
Sources: PRIO / Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2005).
1/  0: No conflict      1: Minor (at least 25 deaths per year for every year in the period) 
     2: Intermediate (more than 25 but fewer than 1000 deaths per year)
     3: War (at least 1000 deaths per year)
     T refers to year 2000 for Sub-Saharan African Countries. 
2/ Values are based on maximum value of any conflict (internal extra-state, interstate, or internationalized internal) during a year.
3/ Mean for SGs adjusted by adding the change in world mean between 1970 and the average for the period 1996-2005.
4/ Since average 1980 is for one year, only one value is valid and reported for each category; Namibia is excluded since the earliest data on it is 1990.
T - 4 to T + 5 T - 9 to T T - 9 to T
Interstate Conflicts
T - 4 to T + 5 T - 9 to T T - 4 to T + 5 Country
All Conflicts













Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max
Chile 1986 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
China,P.R.: Mainland 1978 1.0 3.0 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.0 0.2 1.0
Dominican Republic 1969 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Egypt 1976 0.3 3.0 1.2 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 3.0 1.0 3.0
Indonesia 1967 0.7 1.0 1.4 2.0 0.4 1.0 1.0 2.0 0.4 1.0 0.5 1.0
Korea 1962 0.9 3.0 0.3 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 3.0 0.3 3.0
Malaysia 1970 0.3 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.4 1.0
Singapore 1969 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Taiwan Province of China 1961 0.3 3.0 0.6 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 3.0 0.6 3.0
Thailand 1960 0.9 3.0 1.2 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.3 3.0 0.9 3.0
Tunisia 1968 0.0 0.0 0.3 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 3.0
Vietnam 1985 1.9 3.0 1.8 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 2.0 1.4 3.0
Average … 0.5 1.8 0.6 1.9 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.6 0.5 1.8
Sources: PRIO / Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2005).
1/  0: No conflict      1: Minor (at least 25 deaths per year for every year in the period) 
     2: Intermediate (more than 25 but fewer than 1000 deaths per year)
     3: War (at least 1000 deaths per year)
2/ Values are based on maximum value of any conflict (internal extra-state, interstate, or internationalized internal) during a year.
T - 4 to T + 5 T - 9 to T T - 9 to T
Interstate Conflicts
T - 4 to T + 5 Country
All Conflicts
 2 Internal Conflicts









Table 4a. Indicators for Selected sub-Saharan African Countries: Social Fractionalization 
 
country






Religious based on 
Fearon (2003)
Ethnic based on 
Alesina et al.(2003)
Linguistic based on 
Alesina et al. (2003)
Religious based on 
Alesina et al. (2003)
Group 1: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth >= 2.0%
Angola* 0.78 0.76 0.61 0.79 0.79 0.63
Botswana* 0.51 0.35 0.50 0.41 0.41 0.60
Burkina Faso 0.68 0.70 0.58 0.74 0.72 0.58
Cameroon 0.89 0.89 0.64 0.86 0.89 0.73
Cape Verde n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.42 n.a. 0.08
Chad* 0.83 0.77 0.63 0.86 0.86 0.64
Equatorial Guinea* n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.35 0.32 0.12
Ethiopia 0.69 0.76 0.61 0.72 0.81 0.62
Ghana 0.71 0.85 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.80
Guinea 0.75 0.67 0.27 0.74 0.77 0.26
Lesotho 0.22 0.25 0.32 0.26 0.25 0.72
Liberia* 0.83 0.90 0.64 0.91 0.90 0.49
Mali 0.78 0.75 0.18 0.69 0.84 0.18
Mauritius* 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.46 0.45 0.64
Mozambique 0.65 0.77 0.62 0.69 0.81 0.68
Rwanda* 0.13 0.18 0.51 0.32 n.a. 0.51
Sudan* 0.74 0.71 0.45 0.71 0.72 0.43
Tanzania 0.93 0.95 0.64 0.74 0.90 0.63
Uganda 0.90 0.93 0.72 0.93 0.92 0.63
Average 0.68 0.70 0.54 0.65 0.71 0.53
Average (excl. * countries) 0.72 0.75 0.53 0.68 0.76 0.54
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 equals 
mean for SGs
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 (excl. 
asterisked countries) equals mean for SGs
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.28
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0%
Average 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5










Table 4b. Indicators for Sustained Growth Countries (SGs): Social Fractionalization 
 
country
Ethnic based on 
Easterly and 
Levine (1997)
Ethnic based on 
Fearon (2003)
Religious based on 
Fearon (2003)
Ethnic based on 
Alesina et al.(2003)
Linguistic based on 
Alesina et al. (2003)
Religious based on 
Alesina et al. 
(2003)
Chile 0.14 0.50 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.38
China 0.12 0.15 0.55 0.15 0.13 0.66
Dominican Republic 0.04 0.39 0.10 0.43 0.04 0.31
Egypt 0.04 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.02 0.20
Indonesia 0.76 0.77 0.22 0.74 0.77 0.23
Korea 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.66
Malaysia 0.65 0.60 0.69 0.59 0.60 0.67
Singapore 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.66
Taiwan Province of China 0.27 0.27 0.13 0.27 0.50 0.68
Thailand 0.66 0.43 0.10 0.63 0.63 0.10
Tunisia 0.16 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01
Vietnam 0.27 0.23 0.50 0.24 0.24 0.51
Average 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.42













Table 5a. Indicators for Selected sub-Saharan African Countries: Trade Outcomes
1 
 




Apparel, Footwear and 
Textiles to GDP
3
Fuel&Ore Exports to 
GDP





Apparel, Footwear and 
Textiles to GDP
5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Group 1: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth >= 2.0 percent
Angola* 70.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Botswana* 39.8 44.1 0.7 2.7 1.8 46.7 0.9
Burkina Faso 8.6 0.9 4.7 0.1 6.2 1.1 4.9
Cameroon 19.4 1.1 1.1 7.7 7.6 1.4 1.1
Cape Verde 31.2 1.5 0.9 0.0 0.1 5.7 0.9
Chad* 52.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Equatorial Guinea* n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ethiopia 15.4 0.9 0.2 0.1 6.9 0.5 0.1
Ghana 34.5 2.8 0.4 2.5 15.9 2.7 0.2
Guinea 21.8 3.7 0.0 9.7 19.3 3.9 0.1
Lesotho 55.8 37.6 33.1 0.0 6.3 37.1 32.6
Liberia* 34.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mali 27.5 1.8 0.8 0.4 1.1 0.9 8.6
Mauritius* 55.6 25.6 20.5 0.1 9.3 27.6 23.8
Mozambique 30.9 0.9 0.8 11.9 4.8 0.9 0.8
Rwanda* 10.3 0.1 0.1 1.0 3.7 0.1 0.0
Sudan* 17.7 0.2 0.4 10.6 3.0 0.4 0.9
Tanzania 17.8 1.3 0.8 0.9 6.7 1.2 1.0
Uganda 13.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 5.4 0.7 0.4
Average 31.0 8.2 4.3 3.2 6.5 8.7 5.1
Average (excl. * countries) 25.1 4.8 3.9 3.1 7.3 5.1 4.6
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 equals 
mean for SGs
0.74 0.42 0.28 … … 0.37 0.19
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 (excl. 
asterisked countries) equals mean for SGs
0.71 0.98 0.46 … … 0.89 0.32
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0 percent
Average 44.0 5.9 1.6 6.2 9.0 4.9 1.8
Average (excl. Swaziland) 42.1 4.1 1.1 6.5 8.3 3.7 1.3
Sustained Growth Countries (SGs)
6 19.1 2.2 1.1 4.2 7.8 2.2 1.1
Sustained Growth Countries (SGs)
7 48.9 24.9 5.0 5.6 5.5 24.9 5.0
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI, November 2006 download) and World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database.
1/ Data are averages  for the period  after year 2000, except for the sustained growth countries (SGs) and unless otherwise specified.
2/ Manufacturing corresponds to the products in SITC categories 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic manufactures), 7 (machinery and transport equipment), and 
8 (miscellaneous manufactured goods), excluding category 68 (non-ferrous metals).  
3/ Correspond to the products in SITC categories 26 (textile fibres, not manufactured, and waste), 65 (textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, etc.), 
85 (footwear), and 84 (clothing). 
4/ Data are averages for the period 1995-2000, and correspond to the products in SITC categories specified in footnote 2/.
5/ Data are averages for the period 1995-2000, and correspond to the products in SITC categories specified in footnote 3/.
6/ Data are averages excluding Singapore for the period T to T+4, where T is the first year of the growth acceleration.












































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Chile 1986 32.9 2.5 0.3 14.2 8.7 35.3 4.3 0.2 12.6 9.4
China,P.R.: Mainland 1978 7.2 4.9 2.8 2.6 2.1 26.9 21.9 5.3 1.1 1.3
Dominican Republic 1969 18.9 3.3 0.0 0.5 14.3 44.7 1.3 0.1 0.6 1.6
Egypt 1976 25.3 2.5 4.6 4.7 4.4 20.4 2.1 1.0 2.8 1.0
Indonesia 1967 11.7 0.2 0.0 4.9 5.8 34.6 16.7 4.6 8.9 4.5
Korea 1962 6.6 2.1 1.4 0.7 1.3 39.2 29.8 3.0 1.9 0.8
Malaysia 1970 39.7 3.7 0.5 9.6 23.9 118.0 81.3 3.5 11.3 9.8
Singapore 1969 113.3 28.1 5.9 20.7 32.9 150.5 133.6 3.1 15.5 3.9
Taiwan Province of China 1961 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Thailand 1960 15.9 0.3 0.6 1.2 12.4 66.6 43.1 5.2 2.3 10.4
Tunisia 1968 22.9 2.4 0.3 4.1 5.2 44.9 25.6 14.0 3.6 2.9
Vietnam 1985 10.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 58.2 22.9 13.3 11.1 13.1
Average
5 19.1 2.2 1.1 4.2 7.8 48.9 24.9 5.0 5.6 5.5
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI, November 2006 download) and World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database.
1/  Average for the period T to T+4, except China (1984) and Dominican Republic (1974).
2/ Average for the latest 5 years (2000 to 2004).
3/ Manufacturing corresponds to the products in SITC categories 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic manufactures), 7 (machinery and transport equipment), and 8 (miscellaneous manufactured goods),
excluding category 68 (non-ferrous metals). 
4/ Correspond to the products in SITC categories 26 (textile fibres, not manufactured, and waste), 65 (textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, etc.), 85 (footwear), and 84 (clothing). 
5/  Averages are excluding Singapore.
Trade Outcomes: Initial
1 Trade Outcomes: Latest
2 
 











in Years Since 










4 Aid to GDP
5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Group 1: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth >= 2.0%
Angola* 42.3 15.0 1982 to 1996 53.0 23.0 0.0 5.5
Botswana* 2.6 10.0 1988 to 1987 11.2 8.6 1.0 0.4
Burkina Faso 6.7 16.0 1985 to 2000 16.8 6.4 1.0 12.7
Cameroon 1.7 9.0 1985 to 1993 28.5 2.0 1.0 4.8
Cape Verde -2.9 10.0 1970 to 1979 35.8 0.4 1.0 14.7
Chad* 4.5 4.0 1990 to 1993 6.4 n.a. 0.0 7.4
Equatorial Guinea* 15.5 8.0 1990 to 1997 27.9 n.a. 0.0 0.9
Ethiopia -12.5 9.0 1984 to 1992 28.7 11.6 1.0 18.6
Ghana 9.6 30.0 1970 to 1999 53.7 15.1 1.0 15.7
Guinea -66.2 n.a. … n.a. n.a. 1.0 7.4
Lesotho 20.7 10.0 1991 to 2000 16.1 n.a. 0.0 7.1
Liberia* n.a. n..a n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0 42.0
Mali 20.5 15.0 1986 to 2000 29.7 6.4 1.0 11.6
Mauritius* -78.2 n.a. … n.a. 4.9 1.0 0.6
Mozambique -5.3 3.0 1984 to 1986 34.3 n.a. 1.0 20.3
Rwanda* 17.9 8.0 1993 to 2000 18.1 9.1 0.0 26.1
Sudan* -0.5 n.a. … n.a. n.a. 0.0 4.0
Tanzania 113.1 31.0 1970 to 2000 75.0 8.6 1.0 15.5
Uganda 33.5 21.0 1970 to 1990 119.0 8.2 1.0 17.6
Average 6.8 13.3 … 37.0 8.7 0.6 12.3
Average (excl. * countries) 10.82 15.40 … 43.8 7.3 0.9 13.3
Average, 1980 (excl. * countries) 33.4
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 
equals mean for SGs
0.04 0.02 … 0.01 0.37 0.24 0.02
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 
(excl. asterisked countries) equals 
mean for SGs
0.04 0.02 … 0.01 0.28 0.03 0.00
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 
equals adjusted mean for SGs
6
… … … … 0.05 … 0.02
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 
(excl. asterisked countries) equals 
adjusted mean for SGs
6
… … … … 0.04 … 0.00
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0%
Average 18.2 15.3 … 26.6 8.7 0.4 15.0
Average, 1980
7 …… …… 16.6 ……
Sustained Growth Countries (SGs)
-17.7 6.4 … 11.4 14.6 0.4 4.7
Developing world …… …… …0 . 5 …
Sources: Various
1/ Data are for the most recent period available after 2000, except for the sustained growth countries (SGs).
2/ For Sub-saharan Africa, data refer to the average for the last 5 years for which data were available, except for Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan 
for which they refer to 1996. For the SGs, data corresponds to the average for the period T to L, where T is the start of the growth episode and L the 
latest year for which data were available. The computation of overvaluation is described in the text.
3/ For Sub-saharan Africa, data refer to the maximum annual overvaluation between 1970 and L, and for SGs, data refer to the maximum annual 
overvaluation between T and L, where the overvaluation for any year is computed as the average over the following 5 years.
4/ The score ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values denoting more open regimes. For SGs, data refer to the year T. 
5/ For SGs, data are averages for the period T-4 to T+5, where T is the first year of the growth acceleration.
6/ Mean for SGs adjusted by adding the change in world mean between 1970 and the average for the period 1996-2005.

































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Chile 1986 -15.6 5.0 1979 to 1983 12.2 19.6 1.0 0.1
China,P.R.: Mainland 1978 -27.9 12.0 1970 to 1981 20.6 n.a. 0.0 0.1
Dominican Republic 1969 1.9 10.0 1970 to 1979 10.6 6.4 0.0 3.9
Egypt 1976 -14.5 5.0 1985 to 1989 30.5 13.0 0.0 8.8
Indonesia 1967 -27.3 3.0 1976 to 1978 13.0 53.4 0.4 24.0
Korea 1962 -13.7 9.0 1989 to 1997 10.8 10.6 0.0 6.8
Malaysia 1970 -9.0 6.0 1970 to 1975 7.4 6.9 1.0 0.8
Singapore 1969 11.1 9.0 1970 to 1978 15.4 4.7 1.0 0.8
Taiwan Province of China 1961 9.3 18.0 1980 to 1997 16.5 n.a. 0.6 2.9
Thailand 1960 -22.8 0.0 … 0.0 1.9 1.0 1.1
Tunisia 1968 -29.3 0.0 … 0.0 n.a. 0.0 6.3
Vietnam 1985 -73.9 0.0 … 0.0 n.a. 0.0 0.9
Average -17.7 6.4 … 11.4 14.6 0.4 4.7
Developing world ………… … 0 . 5 …
Sources: Various
1/ The data refer to the start (T) of the growth episode, unless otherwise specified.
2/ Average for the period T to L, where T refers to the start of the growth episode and L the latest year for which data are available.
3/ Average for the period T to T+4, except Korea (1967).
4/ Average for the period T to T+4.
5/ Average for the period T-4 to T+5. 
 
 
Table 7a. Indicators for Selected sub-Saharan African Countries: Costs of Trading
1 
 
No. of Documents 
Required to Export 
(in units)
No. of Signatures 
Needed to Export (in 
units)
Time for Export 
Procedures (in 
calendar days)
No. of Documents 
Required to Import (in 
units)
No. of Signatures 
Needed to Import (in 
units) 
Time for Import 
Procedures (in 
calendar days)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Group 1: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth >= 2.0%
Angola* 6.0 n.a. 74.0 10.0 28.0 85.0
Botswana* 6.0 7.0 37.0 9.0 10.0 42.0
Burkina Faso 9.0 19.0 69.0 13.0 37.0 66.0
Cameroon 10.0 11.0 38.0 14.0 20.0 51.0
Cape Verde 4.0 n.a. 18.0 9.0 n.a. 16.0
Chad* 7.0 32.0 87.0 14.0 42.0 111.0
Equatorial Guinea* 6.0 20.0 26.0 6.0 33.0 50.0
Ethiopia 8.0 33.0 45.0 11.0 45.0 52.0
Ghana 5.0 11.0 21.0 9.0 13.0 42.0
Guinea 7.0 11.0 43.0 12.0 23.0 56.0
Lesotho 6.0 n.a. 46.0 9.0 15.0 51.0
Liberia* n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mali 10.0 33.0 66.0 16.0 60.0 61.0
Mauritius* 5.0 4.0 16.0 7.0 4.0 16.0
Mozambique 6.0 12.0 39.0 16.0 12.0 38.0
Rwanda* 14.0 27.0 60.0 20.0 46.0 95.0
Sudan* 12.0 35.0 56.0 13.0 50.0 83.0
Tanzania 3.0 10.0 24.0 10.0 16.0 39.0
Uganda 12.0 18.0 42.0 19.0 27.0 67.0
Average 7.6 18.9 44.8 12.1 28.3 56.7
Average (excl. * countries) 7.3 17.6 41.0 12.5 26.8 49.0
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 equals 
mean for SGs
0.24 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 (excl. 
asterisked countries) equals mean for SGs
0.24 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0%
Average 8.8 18.5 36.2 12.4 30.9 47.3
Sustained Growth Countries (SGs) 6.6 6.5 19.1 9.4 8.0 21.3
Developing world 7.5 12.6 29.4 10.6 19.1 36.6
Source: The World Bank Doing Business websites:  "http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/TradingAcrossBorders/".









Table 7b. Indicators for Sustained Growth Countries (SGs): Costs of Trading
1 
Year T
No. of Documents 
Required to Export 
(in units)
No. of Signatures 
Needed to Export 
(in units)
Time for Export 
Procedures (in 
calendar days)
No. of Documents 
Required to Import 
(in units)
No. of Signatures 
Needed to Import (in 
units) 
Time for Import 
Procedures (in 
calendar days)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Chile 1986 7.0 7.0 20.0 9.0 8.0 24.0
China,P.R.: Mainland 1978 6.0 7.0 18.0 12.0 8.0 22.0
Dominican Republic 1969 7.0 3.0 17.0 11.0 6.0 17.0
Egypt 1976 8.0 11.0 20.0 8.0 8.0 25.0
Indonesia 1967 7.0 3.0 25.0 10.0 6.0 30.0
Korea 1962 5.0 3.0 12.0 8.0 5.0 12.0
Malaysia 1970 6.0 3.0 20.0 12.0 5.0 22.0
Singapore 1969 5.0 2.0 6.0 6.0 2.0 3.0
Taiwan Province of China 1961 8.0 9.0 14.0 8.0 11.0 14.0
Thailand 1960 9.0 10.0 24.0 12.0 10.0 22.0
Tunisia 1968 5.0 8.0 18.0 8.0 12.0 29.0
Vietnam 1985 6.0 12.0 35.0 9.0 15.0 36.0
Average … 6.6 6.5 19.1 9.4 8.0 21.3
Developing world … 7.5 12.6 29.4 10.6 19.1 36.6
Source: The World Bank Doing Business websites:  "http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/TradingAcrossBorders/".
1/ Data are for the most recent period based on the survey of January 2006, except (2) and (5), which are based on a survey of January 2005. 
 
Table 8a. Indicators for Selected sub-Saharan African Countries: 













Mainlines  (per 
1,000 people)
3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Group 1: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth >= 2.0%
Angola* n.a. 16.5 40.9 39.9 77.0 6 43
Botswana* 104 73.4 36.0 63.2 343.0 76 34
Burkina Faso 48 11.5 47.7 47.7 41.2 6 46
Cameroon 111 35.7 45.9 50.7 132.9 7 121
Cape Verde 114 65.1 70.1 61.7 329.7 148 273
Chad* 71 13.7 43.7 44.5 32.1 1 26
Equatorial Guinea* 119 29.2 43.1 43.6 251.9 20 103
Ethiopia 73 24.5 42.3 42.0 24.1 6 29
Ghana 79 38.7 56.9 53.8 101.2 14 186
Guinea 73 24.8 53.8 42.8 112.9 3 152
Lesotho 127 34.0 36.0 54.3 51.7 20 196
Liberia* n.a. n.a. 42.5 44.9 26.3 n.a. 95
Mali 60 21.3 48.0 42.7 57.0 5 13
Mauritius* 104 80.3 72.3 66.7 953.4 286 966
Mozambique 86 8.7 41.9 42.8 25.6 4 38
Rwanda* 108 13.5 43.7 45.7 33.0 3 456
Sudan* 57 31.3 56.4 50.1 156.1 28 5
Tanzania 89 n.a. 46.1 54.8 31.8 4 88
Uganda 131 18.0 47.8 49.9 64.9 2 294
Average 91.4 31.8 48.2 49.6 149.8 35.6 166.4
Average (excl. * countries) 90 28 49 49 88 20 130
Average, 1980 (excl. * countries) 68.6 28.9
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 equals 
mean for SGs
0.60 0.56 0.00 … 0.01 0.45 0.30
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 (excl. 
asterisked countries) equals mean for SGs
5
0.67 0.20 0.00 … 0.00 0.86 0.29
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 equals 
adjusted mean for SGs
0.00 0.00 0.04 … 0.00 0.00 …
P-value for T-test: mean for Group 1 (excl. 
asterisked countries) equals adjusted mean for 
SGs
5
0.01 0.00 0.06 … 0.00 0.00 …
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0%
Average 89 34.6 48.8 50.9 216 27 155
Average, 1980
6 79.4 19.2 … … ………
Sustained Growth Countries (SGs) 95 35.9 59.5 64.7 522.5 21 204
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI, November 2006 download), and Deninger and Squire (1996).
1/ Data are for the most recent period available after 2000, except for the sustained growth countries (SGs). 
2/ Measured as the gross enrollment ratio. For SGs, data refer to T or to the year closest to T for which data are available (see tables 6b and 6c for details).
3/ For SGs, data refer to T or to the year closest to T for which data are available (see table 8c).
4/  For SGs, data refer to 1990 and exclude Singapore.
5/ Mean for SGs adjusted by adding the change in world mean between 1970 and the average for the period 1996-2005.
6/ Eritrea (1992), Seychelles (1998), Gabon (1990), Namibia (1998)  and Sao Tome & Principe (1998) are excluded. 





















Physicians  (per 
million people)
3
Telephone Mainlines  
(per 1,000 people)
3




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Chile 1986 105.0 66.9 72.7 70.7 816.8 45.4 105.2
China,P.R.: Mainland 1978 112.6 45.9 65.4 67.8 1080.0 2.0 123.0
Dominican Republic 1969 98.4 21.2 59.9 63.0 435.0 19.0 227.8
Egypt 1976 70.0 40.3 54.1 56.5 535.9 8.9 45.9
Indonesia 1967 80.0 16.1 46.0 56.2 37.3 1.5 151.6
Korea 1962 103.4 41.6 55.2 67.7 600.0 30.0 571.4
Malaysia 1970 88.7 34.2 63.0 68.0 232.0 13.8 261.2
Singapore 1969 105.5 46.0 68.5 71.8 656.9 93.0 4114.7
Taiwan Province of China 1961 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Thailand 1960 81.4 17.4 53.9 65.2 128.9 5.5 140.6
Tunisia 1968 100.4 22.7 52.1 63.7 168.5 11.6 122.4
Vietnam 1985 103.0 42.7 63.4 61.4 1056.0 1.2 289.7
Average 95.3 35.9 59.5 64.7 522.5 21.1 203.9
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI, November 2006 download), and Deninger and Squire (1996).
1/ The data refer to the start (T) of the growth episode, unless otherwise specified.
2/ Measured as the gross enrollment ratio. Data refer to T or to the year closest to T for which data are available (see table 6c for details).
3/ Data refer to T or to the year closest to T for which data are available (see Table 6c for details)















Education Year T 1980 Physicians Telephone Mainlines 
Total Roads per Surface 
Area
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Chile 1986 1985 1985 1987 1982 1984 1986 1990
China,P.R.: Mainland 1978 1980 1980 1977 1982 1978 1978 1990
Dominican Republic 1969 1970 1970 1972 1982 1975 1980 1990
Egypt 1976 1975 1975 1977 1982 1975 1976 1990
Indonesia 1967 1970 1970 1967 1982 1970 1975 1990
Korea 1962 1970 1970 1962 1982 1985 1975 1990
Malaysia 1970 1970 1970 1972 1982 1970 1975 1990
Singapore 1969 1970 1970 1972 1982 1970 1975 1990
Taiwan Province of China 1961 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Thailand 1960 1970 1970 1963 1982 1960 1975 1990
Tunisia 1968 1970 1970 1968 1982 1970 1975 1990





Appendix Data and Sources 
 
We describe briefly the data used in the analysis in this paper and their sources.   
Variable Description  Source 




Political institutions  Measured as the constraint on the executive 
(which is an assessment of the operational (de 
facto) independence of the chief executive of 
the country). Values range from 1-7, with 
higher score denoting better institutions 
Polity IV 
Manufacturing 
exports to GDP 
Manufacturing exports exclude agricultural 







and textile exports 
SITC categories 26, 65, 84, and 85  WITS 
Exports of fuel and 
ore and agricultural 
products 
 WDI 
Trade openness  Dummy taking value of 1 if country is 
considered open (as defined in Sachs and 








This is a measure of a deviation of a country’s 
actual real exchange rate from a benchmark 
PPP exchange rate. Details are described in the 
text. 
Staff estimates 
Aid   Ratio of net overseas development assistance 
to GDP and includes all multilateral and 
bilateral assistance, including debt relief 
OECD’s DAC 
database 
Size of government  Ratio of real government consumption to GDP  PWT 
Fiscal position  Ratio of general government fiscal balance 




Nominal instability  Measured as the logarithm of the annual 
average percentage change in the nominal 





Appendix Data and Sources 
 
Variable Description  Source 
Primary education  Measured as the gross primary schooling 
enrollment ratio. The gross enrollment ratio is 
the total enrollment at a given educational 
level, regardless of age, divided by the 
population of the age group that typically 
corresponds to that level of education. The 
specification of age groups varies by country, 
based on different national systems of 
education and the duration of schooling at the 
primary and secondary levels. 
WDI 
Secondary education  Measured as the gross secondary schooling 
enrollment ratio 
WDI 





This is an assessment of factors affecting the 
risk to investment. The risk rating assigned is 
the sum of three subcomponents (contract 
viability/expropriation, payments delays, and 
profits repatriation), each with a maximum 
score of four points and a minimum score of 0 
points. The measure thus varies from 0 (high 









Measured as the costs per capita of starting a 
business; and various measures of costs of 




Measures of social 
and physical 
infrastructure 
 WDI  
 
Table 9. Indicators for Selected sub-Saharan African Countries, 1996-20051: Income, 















PPP Real GDP Per 
Capita  (Constant 
2000 $)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0 percent
Benin 1.69 1.85 4.71 959 2,850 3.08 7.4
Burundi -1.94 -1.55 0.43 607 760 2.03 6.7
Central African 0.57 0.78 0.85 1,092 1,102 1.68 3.8
Comoros -1.85 -1.42 1.99 1,777 262 2.11 0.5
Congo, Dem. Rep.* -2.92 -2.87 0.10 702 5,650 2.46 51.2
Congo, Republic* -1.31 -2.15 3.46 965 3,110 3.16 3.5
Côte d'Ivoire -0.15 0.12 1.46 1,542 12,700 2.07 16.8
Djibouti 1.11 1.52 1.31 1,908 573 2.65 0.7
Eritrea -0.68 -0.83 2.64 1,000 742 3.51 3.7
Gabon -1.49 -1.08 1.75 6,223 5,570 2.13 1.3
Gambia, The 0.73 0.91 4.20 1,697 409 3.08 1.3
Guinea-Bissau 0.00 -0.03 0.47 769 240 2.88 1.4
Kenya 0.02 0.04 2.55 1,036 14,000 2.30 31.0
Madagascar -0.55 -0.27 3.22 796 4,260 2.88 16.5
Malawi 1.11 0.77 3.33 579 1,970 2.42 11.7
Mauritania 1.35 1.48 4.87 1,743 1,240 2.88 2.7
Namibia 1.69 1.71 3.96 6,224 3,990 2.07 1.9
Niger -0.26 -0.20 3.45 728 2,300 3.40 12.0
Nigeria 1.39 1.40 4.25 916 50,400 2.36 119.0
Senegal 1.35 1.38 4.68 1,450 5,480 2.46 10.5
Seychelles 0.92 n.a. 2.05 16,247 631 1.15 0.1
Sierra Leone* -0.64 -0.59 5.20 590 879 2.89 4.7
South Africa 1.65 1.35 3.28 9,814 153,000 1.44 43.7
Swaziland 1.42 1.42 2.76 4,352 1,640 2.28 1.0
São Tomé & Prínc 0.53 1.00 2.94 n.a. 50 2.05 0.1
Togo -0.20 -0.34 3.51 1,451 1,640 3.09 5.4
Zambia 0.05 0.12 3.80 816 4,100 1.99 10.7
Zimbabwe -2.43 -1.88 -2.44 2,416 9,650 0.96 12.6
Average 0.04 0.10 2.7 2,533 10,328 2.4 13.6
Average (excl. * countries in group 2) 0.24 0.34 2.6 2,756 11,182 2.4 12.9
Average Sub-Saharan Africa 1.97 2.1 4.53 2,644 8,350 2.43 14.1
Weighted Average Sub-Saharan Africa
2 1.44 1.51 4.15 1,720 … 2.38 …
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI, November 2006 download), unless otherwise indicated.
1/ All variables are averages for the period 1996-2005, unless otherwise indicated.
2/ Weighted by population.
3/ Real per Capita GDP Growth is  the average of  WDI and Penn World Table's estimates for the period 1995-2004.

































Total Amount of 
Tax Payable  (as 
a percentage of 
gross profits) 
Costs of Entry 
(measured in % 
per capita 
income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Uganda 4.1 3.0 33.5 9.0 2.8 237.0 42.9 117.8
Average 4.7 3.8 32.3 7.9 3.1 282.3 49.8 127.7
Average (excl. * countries) 2.9 3.3 32.2 7.9 3.1 319.2 48.9 138.5
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0%
Benin 1.5 5 n.a. n.a. 3.2 36 270 68.5 173.3
Burundi -1.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.3 42 140 286.7 222.4
Central African -0.8 2 n.a. n.a. 2.1 61 504 209.5 209.3
Comoros -0.1 7 n.a. n.a. 2.4 n.a. 100 47.5 192.3
Congo, Dem. Rep.* -2.4 2 21.8 6.0 1.0 n.a. 312 235.4 481.1
Congo, Republic* 0.2 n.a. 35.4 8.5 2.0 n.a. 576 57.3 214.8
Côte d'Ivoire -0.6 n.a. 34.3 5.0 1.5 45 270 45.7 134.1
Djibouti -1.3 3 n.a. n.a. 2.6 n.a. 114 41.7 222
Eritrea -0.9 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 216 86.3 115.9
Gabon -0.4 2 36.6 9.0 1.0 n.a. 272 48.3 162.8
Gambia, The 1.0 2 34.6 8.5 2.5 50 376 291.4 292.1
Guinea-Bissau -2.4 2 26.0 7.5 2.0 47 208 47.5 261.2
Kenya 0.2 6 33.0 9.5 1.0 43 432 74.2 46.3
Madagascar 0.3 5 30.3 8.0 4.0 47 304 43.2 35
Malawi 0.9 6 27.7 8.0 2.0 50 878 32.6 134.7
Mauritania 1.9 3 n.a. n.a. 3.5 39 696 104.3 121.6
Namibia 1.8 5 35.8 10.0 1.5 74 n.a. 25.6 18
Niger 0.0 5 30.7 7.5 1.0 51 270 46 416.8
Nigeria 1.8 5 28.6 6.5 1.3 44 n.a. 31.4 54.4
Senegal 2.1 6 35.2 8.0 2.5 41 696 47.7 112.6
Seychelles 0.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.5 n.a. 76 48.8 9.1
Sierra Leone* 2.1 5 25.5 8.0 2.0 n.a. 399 277 n.a.
South Africa 1.8 7 36.3 2.0 1.0 58 350 38.3 6.9
Swaziland 0.4 2 n.a. n.a. 2.5 61 104 39.5 41.1
São Tomé & Prínc 0.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.8 n.a. 424 55.2 147.2
Togo 0.4 2 31.5 8.5 1.5 n.a. 270 48.3 252.7
Zambia 1.8 5 24.0 7.0 3.0 42 131 22.2 29.9
Zimbabwe -3.4 2 11.8 1.5 0.0 50 216 37 35.6
Average 0.22 4.0 29.9 7.2 2.1 49.0 330.9 87.0 153.5
Average (excl. * countries) 0.24 4.0 30.4 7.1 2.1 49.0 318.1 74.7 137.9
Sustained Growth Countries 
(SGs)
4.9 2.2 31.7 7.1 3.4 39.5 348 44 25
Developing world 283.7 55.2 77.6
Sources: WDI (November 2006 download), ICRG, Polity IV, and World Bank Doing Business websites.
1/ Data are for the most recent 10 year period available, except for the sustained growth countries (SGs). Asterisk denote countries with strong initial institutions or
those recovering from conflict or experiencing a commodity boom.
2/ The data from WDI. For SGs, data refer to the average for the period T to L, where T refers to the start of the growth episode and L the latest year (2005).
3/ Score ranges from 1 to 7. The higher the score the more the constraints on the executive. The data refer to year 2004 for SSA countries, and  to the period T for SGs.
4/ Score for economic risk ranges from 1 to 50.  The higher the score the lower the risk. For SGs data refer to 1984,  and for SSA economic risk to 2002.
5/ Score investment risk ranges from 1 to 12. For SGs data refer to 1996, and for SSA to 2006.
6/ Score ranges from 1 to 6. The higher the score the less the corruption. For SGs data refer to 1996, and for SSA to 2004 or 2005.
7/ The data are from the World Bank Doing Business websites:  "http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/PayingTaxes/".  Data for all the countries 
including SGs are for the most recent period based on the survey of January 2006.
8/ For SGs, data refer to T or to the year closest to T for which data are available (see table 8c).










Table 11. Indicators for Selected sub-Saharan African Countries: Conflicts 
1 
Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 1.85%
Benin 00 00 00 00 0 0 0 0
Burundi 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0
Central African 11 00 11 00 0 0 0 0
Comoros 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0
Congo, Dem. Rep. 33 33 00 00 0 0 0 0
Congo, Republic 33 33 00 11 0 0 0 0
Côte d'Ivoire 11 00 11 00 0 0 0 0
Djibouti 11 11 11 11 0 0 0 0
Eritrea 33 33 11 11 3 3 3 3
Gabon 00 00 00 00 0 0 0 0
Gambia, The 00 00 00 00 0 0 0 0
Guinea-Bissau 33 33 00 00 0 0 0 0
Kenya 00 00 00 00 0 0 0 0
Madagascar 00 00 00 00 0 0 0 0
Malawi 00 00 00 00 0 0 0 0
Mauritania 00 00 00 00 0 0 0 0
Namibia 33 33 00 00 0 0 0 0
Niger 11 33 11 11 0 0 3 3
Nigeria 11 11 11 00 1 1 1 1
Senegal 33 33 22 22 0 0 3 3
Seychelles n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sierra Leone 33 33 33 33 0 0 0 0
South Africa 11 11 00 00 0 0 0 0
Swaziland 00 00 00 00 0 0 0 0
São Tomé & Prínc n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Togo 00 11 00 11 0 0 0 0
Zambia 00 00 00 00 0 0 0 0
Zimbabwe 33 33 00 00 0 0 0 0
Average 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4
Average, 1980
3 0 . 2… …… 0 . 2… …… 0 . 0 … … …
Sustained Growth Countries (SGs) 0.5 1.8 0.6 1.9 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.6 0.5 1.8
Sources: PRIO / Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2005).
1/  0: No conflict      1: Minor (at least 25 deaths per year for every year in the period) 
     2: Intermediate (more than 25 but fewer than 1000 deaths per year)
     3: War (at least 1000 deaths per year)
     T refers to year 2000 for Sub-Saharan African Countries. 
2/ Values are based on maximum value of any conflict (internal extra-state, interstate, or internationalized internal) during a year.
3/ Since average 1980 is for one year, only one value is valid and reported for each category; Namibia is excluded since the earliest data on it is 1990.
T - 4 to T + 5 T - 9 to T T - 9 to T
Interstate Conflicts
T - 4 to T + 5 T - 9 to T T - 4 to T + 5 Country
All Conflicts









Table 12.  Indicators for Selected sub-Saharan African Countries: Social Fractionalization 
country






Religious based on 
Fearon (2003)
Ethnic based on 
Alesina et al.(2003)
Linguistic based on 
Alesina et al. (2003)
Religious based on 
Alesina et al. (2003)
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0%
Benin 0.62 0.62 0.47 0.79 0.79 0.55
Burundi 0.04 0.33 0.55 0.30 0.30 0.52
Central African 0.69 0.79 0.78 0.83 0.83 0.79
Comoros n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.00 0.01 0.01
Congo, Dem. Rep.* 0.90 0.93 0.68 0.87 0.87 0.70
Congo, Republic* 0.66 0.88 0.52 0.87 0.69 0.66
Côte d'Ivoire 0.86 0.78 0.56 0.82 0.78 0.76
Djibouti 0.69 0.61 0.11 0.80 0.66 0.04
Eritrea 0.59 0.65 0.58 0.65 0.65 0.43
Gabon 0.69 0.86 0.46 0.77 0.78 0.67
Gambia, The 0.73 0.76 0.18 0.79 0.81 0.10
Guinea-Bissau 0.80 0.82 0.55 0.81 0.81 0.61
Kenya 0.83 0.85 0.70 0.86 0.89 0.78
Madagascar 0.06 0.86 0.56 0.88 0.02 0.52
Malawi 0.62 0.83 0.62 0.67 0.60 0.82
Mauritania 0.34 0.62 0.00 0.62 0.33 0.01
Namibia 0.68 0.72 0.26 0.63 0.70 0.66
Niger 0.73 0.64 0.32 0.65 0.65 0.20
Nigeria 0.87 0.80 0.58 0.85 0.85 0.74
Senegal 0.72 0.73 0.15 0.69 0.70 0.15
Seychelles n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.20 0.16 0.23
Sierra Leone* 0.77 0.76 0.54 0.82 0.76 0.54
South Africa 0.88 0.88 0.46 0.75 0.87 0.86
Swaziland 0.39 0.28 0.48 0.06 0.17 0.44
São Tomé & Prínc n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.23 0.19
Togo 0.71 0.88 0.46 0.71 0.90 0.66
Zambia 0.82 0.73 0.46 0.78 0.87 0.74
Zimbabwe 0.54 0.37 0.51 0.39 0.45 0.74
Average 0.65 0.72 0.46 0.66 0.61 0.50









Table 13. Indicators for Selected sub-Saharan African Countries: Trade Outcomes
1 
 





Apparel, Footwear and 
Textiles to GDP
3
Fuel&Ore Exports to 
GDP





Apparel, Footwear and 
Textiles to GDP
5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0 percent
Benin 13.5 0.7 4.9 0.0 7.0 0.7 7.3
Burundi 8.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 4.7 0.1 0.0
Central African n.a. 3.1 0.4 1.6 2.3 5.1 1.5
Comoros 14.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.7 0.0
Congo, Dem. Rep.* 34.1 1.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Congo, Republic* 82.3 1.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.4 0.0
Côte d'Ivoire 50.4 8.6 2.0 5.1 27.9 5.8 2.1
Djibouti n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Eritrea 8.9 0.7 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.6 0.1
Gabon 58.5 2.1 0.1 30.9 4.7 1.7 0.1
Gambia, The 43.4 0.6 0.1 0.0 1.5 0.9 0.4
Guinea-Bissau 37.3 0.0 0.2 n.a. 9.4 0.7 0.2
Kenya 24.7 3.2 0.5 3.1 7.7 3.3 0.6
Madagascar 25.6 4.0 2.7 0.7 8.3 3.8 2.8
Malawi 26.8 3.3 2.7 0.1 21.3 2.6 1.9
Mauritania 38.5 20.4 0.0 2.2 14.8 0.9 0.0
Namibia 46.3 18.0 0.3 3.8 15.3 21.4 0.3
Niger 15.0 0.5 0.5 4.4 3.3 4.1 2.2
Nigeria 53.1 1.0 0.1 38.5 0.1 0.5 0.1
Senegal n.a. 6.5 0.5 4.1 6.1 4.7 0.5
Seychelles 106.4 2.3 0.0 12.7 28.2 3.2 0.0
Sierra Leone* 24.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 4.1 n.a. n.a.
South Africa 26.6 11.9 0.5 5.3 2.4 9.1 0.5
Swaziland 88.3 43.2 12.1 0.8 22.6 34.6 11.7
São Tomé & Prínc 47.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.1 0.0
Togo 33.7 10.1 2.8 2.6 6.6 4.6 6.6
Zambia 16.4 3.0 1.6 17.9 4.5 3.8 2.1
Zimbabwe 170.2 5.2 2.6 4.4 9.2 8.1 3.0
Average 43.8 5.7 1.4 5.8 8.9 4.9 1.8
Average (excl. Swaziland) 41.9 4.2 0.9 6.0 8.4 3.7 1.3
Sustained Growth Countries (SGs)
6 19.1 2.2 1.1 4.2 7.8 2.2 1.1
Sustained Growth Countries (SGs)
7 48.9 24.9 5.0 5.6 5.5 24.9 5.0
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI, November 2006 download) and World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database.
1/ Data are averages  for the period  after year 2000, except for the sustained growth countries (SGs) and unless otherwise specified.
2/ Manufacturing corresponds to the products in SITC categories 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic manufactures), 7 (machinery and transport equipment), and
8 (miscellaneous manufactured goods), excluding category 68 (non-ferrous metals).  Data are for the period 1995-2000.
3/ Correspond to the products in SITC categories 26 (textile fibres, not manufactured, and waste), 65 (textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, etc.), 
85 (footwear), and 84 (clothing).  Data are for the period 1995-2000.
4/ Data are averages for the period 1995-2000, and correspond to the products in SITC categories specified in footnote 2/.
5/ Data are averages for the period 1995-2000, and correspond to the products in SITC categories specified in footnote 3/.
6/ Data are averages for the period T to T+4, where T is the first year of the growth acceleration.
7/ Data are averages for the most recent 5 years.    
 

















4 Aid to GDP
5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0%
Benin 29.2 15.0 1986 to 2000 30.3 5.4 1.0 9.5
Burundi 4.1 8.0 1980 to 1987 18.3 13.5 1.0 53.0
Central African 30.9 12.0 1987 to 1998 19.9 2.9 0.0 7.7
Comoros -15.7 . … 0.0 n.a. 0.0 6.8
Congo, Dem. Rep. 72.9 28.0 1970 to 1997 83.4 21.3 0.0 27.7
Congo, Republic 49.3 31.0 1970 to 2000 53.5 1.3 0.0 2.8
Côte d'Ivoire 18.1 15.0 1986 to 2000 20.8 3.9 1.0 1.0
Djibouti 12.5 1.0 1996 12.5 n.a. 0.0 9.7
Eritrea 4.3 1.0 1996 4.3 n.a. 0.0 28.0
Gabon -0.7 9.0 1985 to 1993 17.2 0.1 0.0 0.5
Gambia, The 20.7 9.0 1992 to 2000 20.3 3.2 1.0 15.8
Guinea-Bissau 30.5 31.0 1970 to 2000 42.9 n.a. 1.0 28.1
Kenya 9.4 21.0 1970 to 1990 16.9 10.3 1.0 4.0
Madagascar 38.9 15.0 1973 to 1987 18.7 18.5 1.0 27.3
Malawi 20.2 24.0 1977 to 2000 20.0 15.4 0.0 25.3
Mauritania 19.4 19.0 1981 to 1999 26.0 12.1 1.0 12.0
Namibia 12.0 11.0 1970 to 1980 52.8 2.3 0.0 3.2
Niger 8.5 16.0 1984 to 1999 16.1 7.8 1.0 17.4
Nigeria 125.6 31.0 1970 to 2000 94.1 13.5 0.0 0.8
Senegal 17.0 16.0 1985 to 2000 30.0 1.7 0.0 14.5
Seychelles 14.0 12.0 1986 to 1997 23.4 n.a. 0.0 1.4
Sierra Leone -8.8 9.0 1977 to 1985 18.7 12.1 0.0 32.7
South Africa -14.7 n.a. 1994 to 1995 0.0 3.4 1.0 0.3
Swaziland -47.2 n.a. … 1.3 n.a. 0.0 4.8
São Tomé & Prínc -4.8 4.0 1986 to 1989 24.4 n.a. 0.0 57.9
Togo 45.0 14.0 1987 to 2000 30.1 6.8 0.0 2.9
Zambia 64.6 16.0 1970 to 1985 33.3 18.3 1.0 20.4
Zimbabwe -46.0 14.0 1970 to 1983 15.0 n.a. 0.0 4.0
Average 18.2 15.3 … 26.6 8.7 0.4 15.0
Average, 1980
6 … … … … 16.6 … …
Sustained Growth Countries 
(SGs)
-17.7 6.4 … 11.4 14.6 0.4 4.7
Developing world ……… … … 0 . 5 …
Sources: Various
1/ Data are for the most recent period available after 2000, except for the sustained growth countries (SGs).
2/ For Sub-saharan Africa, data refer to the average for the last 5 years for which data were available, except for Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan for which 
they refer to 1996. For the SGs, data corresponds to the average for the period T to L, where T is the start of the growth episode and L the latest year for 
which data were available. The computation of overvaluation is described in the text.
3/ For SGs, data are averages for the period T to T+4, where T is the first year of the growth acceleration.
4/ The score ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values denoting more open regimes. For SGs, data refer to the year T. 
5/ For SGs, data are averages for the period T-4 to T+5, where T is the first year of the growth acceleration.
6/ For inflation, Benin and Namibia are excluded since the earliest data on them are 1991; year 1981
     data are used for Certral Afr. Republic, and Malawi. 
 
Table 15. Indicators for Selected sub-Saharan African Countries: Costs of Trading
1 
 
No. of Documents 
Required to Export (in 
units)
No. of Signatures 
Needed to Export (in 
units)
Time for Export 
Procedures (in 
calendar days)
No. of Documents 
Required to Import (in 
units)
No. of Signatures 
Needed to Import (in 
units) 
Time for Import 
Procedures (in 
calendar days)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0%
Benin 8 10 35 11 14 48
Burundi 12 29 80 14 55 124
Central African 9 38 63 19 75 60
Comoros 9 n.a. 28 8 n.a. 22
Congo, Dem. Rep. 8 45 64 12 80 92
Congo, Republic 12 42 50 15 51 62
Côte d'Ivoire 9 11 21 19 21 48
Djibouti 15 n.a. 25 14 n.a. 26
Eritrea 11 2 69 18 5 69
Gabon 4 n.a. 19 10 n.a. 26
Gambia, The 4 n.a. 19 8 n.a. 23
Guinea-Bissau 8 n.a. 27 9 n.a. 26
Kenya 11 15 25 9 20 45
Madagascar 8 15 48 11 18 48
Malawi 8 12 44 16 20 60
Mauritania 9 13 25 7 25 40
Namibia 9 7 32 14 7 25
Niger n.a. n.a. n.a. 19 52 89
Nigeria 11 39 25 13 71 45
Senegal 6 8 22 10 12 26
Seychelles 6 n.a. 17 7 n.a. 19
Sierra Leone 7 8 29 7 22 33
South Africa 5 7 31 9 9 34
Swaziland 9 n.a. 9 14 n.a. 35
São Tomé & Prínc 8 n.a. 27 10 n.a. 29
Togo 7 8 32 9 14 41
Zambia 16 25 60 19 28 62
Zimbabwe 9 18 52 15 19 66
Average 8.8 18.5 36.2 12.4 30.9 47.3
Sustained Growth Countries 
(SGs) 6.6 6.5 19.1 9.4 8.0 21.3
Developing world 7.5 12.6 29.4 10.6 19.1 36.6
Source: The World Bank Doing Business websites:  "http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/TradingAcrossBorders/".
1/ Data are for the most recent period based on the survey of January 2006, except (2) and (5), which are based on a survey of January 2005. 
 













Mainlines  (per 
1,000 people)
3





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Group 2: Sub-Saharan African Countries with Growth < 2.0%
Benin 92.5 23.8 55 51 45 9 60
Burundi 71.6 11.3 44 47 28 3 520
Central African 66.8 11.6 39 48 85 2 38
Comoros 87.8 31.6 63 50 146 23 395
Congo, Dem. Rep.* 64.0 23.0 44 48 107 0 68
Congo, Republic* 84.5 33.8 52 57 198 3 37
Côte d'Ivoire 73.3 24.9 46 54 123 13 156
Djibouti 37.6 18.8 53 49 181 14 125
Eritrea 64.4 28.5 54 44 50 9 34
Gabon 129.2 49.7 54 56 292 29 61
Gambia, The 78.8 34.3 56 44 n.a. n.a. 285
Guinea-Bissau 69.7 17.8 45 39 122 7 122
Kenya 105.3 44.6 48 59 139 9 110
Madagascar 113.4 n.a. 56 49 291 3 85
Malawi 133.5 31.1 40 46 22 7 240
Mauritania 88.5 21.5 53 47 105 13 8
Namibia 101.0 59.9 47 59 297 64 71
Niger 39.0 6.5 45 39 30 2 8
Nigeria 104.5 35.0 44 46 n.a. 8 210
Senegal 70.4 17.1 56 48 57 21 72
Seychelles 114.4 110.9 n.a. 69 1513 255 n.a.
Sierra Leone* 78.9 26.2 41 38 33 5 158
South Africa 105.5 88.6 45 58 770 105 302
Swaziland 100.0 42.4 42 53 158 42 191
São Tomé & Prínc 129.0 38.6 63 60 491 47 333
Togo 103.1 38.3 55 56 45 10 132
Zambia 84.0 25.2 38 52 116 8 105
Zimbabwe 98.0 39.7 37 60 161 24 249
Average 88.9 34.6 48.8 50.9 215.6 27.2 154.7
Average, 1980 (excl. * countries) 79.4 19.2 … … ………
Sustained Growth Countries (SGs) 95.3 35.9 59.5 64.7 522.5 21.1 203.9
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI, November 2006 download), and Deninger and Squire (1996).
1/ Data are for the most recent period available after 2000, except for the sustained growth countries (SGs). 
2/ Measured as the gross enrollment ratio. For SGs, data refer to T or to the year closest to T for which data are available 
    (see tables 8b and 8c for details).
3/ For SGs, data refer to T or to the year closest to T for which data are available (see table 8c).
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